




First of all, that’s Christopher King, Esq. as noted on the 15 September 2008 correspondence letter from the Columbus Bar Association that I will scan later today.
Second, watch the trail of this case at entries
one and
two with links to video of Jerry’s First Amendment/bogus criminal trespass trial a decade ago on
KingCast.net when we all wore substantially more hair. What a pain that was, Gheri-Curl activator, blah blah blah....just kidding. Anyway, that’s Minister Donell Muhammad standing next to Jerry Doyle and who calls me “The Johnny Cochran of Columbus.”
Third, oh my goodness. And I’m not saying it, mostly I just let the Courts say it for me and you can
read it here at Scribd.com or in the comments if you’re in a hurry.
Due Process:Tribell v. Mills, 25 F.3d 1050 (Table) C.A.6 (Tenn.),1994.
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 469 (1983).
In re Lamb, 34 Ohio App.2d 85, 296 N.E.2d 280, Ohio App. 1973.
Qualified Immunity:Rich v. City of Mayfield Heights, 955 F.2d 1092 (6th Cir.1992)
Phillips v. Roane County, Tenn., 534 F.3d 531 C.A.6 (Tenn.),2008.
5. Qualified ImmunityPrison officials' deliberate indifference violates an inmate's rights under the Eighth Amendment when the indifference is manifested by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 8.
Phillips v. Roane, supra.
Note: Phillips v. Roane denied Summary Judgment and it too, is a Diabetes case.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, R. Guy Cole, Jr., Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) detainee had serious medical condition;
(2) officers' alleged conduct amounted to deliberate indifference;
(3) one paramedic's conduct amounted to deliberate indifference;
(4) one paramedic was entitled to qualified immunity;
(5) county supervisory officials were not liable under § 1983 for their alleged failure to properly train;
(6) alleged conduct of doctor amounted to deliberate indifference; and
(7) pretrial detainee's due process right to medical attention for serious medical needs was clearly established.
From
Tribell, supra*5 [G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions [have] qualified immunity ... shielding them from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated. Somewhat more concretely, whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action generally turns on the “objective legal reasonableness” of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were “clearly established” at the time it was taken[.]”
It is clear in this case that Defendants have some work to do. Plaintiff Doyle was confined “to the hole” with absolutely no hearing or Due Process consideration. A trier of fact could determine -- after hearing all of the relevant evidence that Plaintiff is entitled to seek discovery on – that it happened because Judge Pollitt was upset that Plaintiff exercised his First Amendment Rights by calling in to Bob Conners’ radio show during his confinement in the general population. That would strip Pollitt of any absolute, qualified or implied immunity, especially because the Court noted at pp 9-10 of the Magistrate’s Report and Recommendation that Judges no longer have the authority to unilaterally send an inmate “to the hole.”
7. Cruel and Unusual PunishmentMr. Doyle was subjected to conditions that may constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment, including the back-up toilet, bug-infested floor and lack of medical attention that he alleges led to the loss of his leg.
But KingCast, how do you distinguish Stump?In
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) a judge acted within the ambit of his authority when he ordered a retarded girl sterilized pursuant to an ex parte motion, as offensive as it was to some people involved, he had jurisdictional authority to do that. But even
Stump noted “he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in clear absences of all jurisdiction,” which is precisely what happened in this case.
There is no official judicial order and Plaintiff was not subjected to any sort of legal process there was no possible legal process by which Judge Pollitt could do what he did, as acknowledged by the Court at pp. 9-10 of its Recommendation. Plaintiff was instead subjected to the whimsy of a particular Judge who was upset about Plaintiff exercising his First Amendment Rights. Accord the situation of Judge Carole Squire, who was removed and suspended for two years for this sort of
“intemperance and complete disrespect to litigants.” Supreme Court case
2007-0492.