24 June 2008

Dear Attorney Mullen: How hard is it to produce the Franconia Citizen Police Complaint procedures and Motorola 2-way radio manual?

Sir, with all due respect (one must wonder how much respect is due anymore) you said you were going to have these documents to me weeks ago, as noted in the comments section to this post.

1. You can't train officers without the Motorola manual.

2. You can't Constitutionally address citizen concerns without a complaint policy.

I want these items RIGHT NOW.

Very truly yours/KingCast.net

Related post: It's not rocket science but it sure is a meltdown.

And folks are watching it happen, despite best attempts to keep this message from being respected. In descendig order: Page views, unique sessions, unique vistors, IP hosts.

8 comments:

Christopher King said...

Oh what the hell I'll post it here too:

12:00

Here we go:

RE: Outstanding RSA 91-A requests to Town of Franconia/Chief MontminyThursday, May 22, 2008 3:51 PM
From: "Christopher King" kingjurisdoctor@yahoo.com
To: "Daniel J. Mullen" dmullen@ranspell.com
Cc: police@franconianh.org

Dear Attorney Mullen:

Thank you for the update.

The serial number question pertains to the equipment in use on 5/11. I look forward to hearing from you on the other items as soon as possible.

I will be approaching the coroner for the toxicology reports pursuant to Swickard v. Wayne County Medical Examiner, 438 Mich. 536 (1991).

Best regards,

Christopher King, J.D.

--- On Thu, 5/22/08, Daniel J. Mullen dmullen@ranspell.com wrote:

From: Daniel J. Mullen dmullen@ranspell.com
Subject: RE: Outstanding RSA 91-A requests to Town of Franconia/Chief Montminy
To: kingjurisdoctor@yahoo.com
Cc: police@franconianh.org
Date: Thursday, May 22, 2008, 3:20 PM

Dear Mr. King:

We are in the process of gathering information to respond to your requests. However, I can respond to some of your requests in this email.

1. The town does not have any toxicology reports for Bruce McKay.

2. On your request for info/manuals on Bruce McKay’s radio/GPS, I was not aware of this request until this email. If you had previously forwarded a request by mail and I received but somehow overlooked, I apologize. If you made the request via email, I did not see it and I again request that you make any such request by mail. In the meantime, I will ask the town to gather whatever information it has on this request.


3. The town has gathered the cell phone records pursuant to your request. However, cell phones are not assigned to officers but are assigned to police vehicles. In order to respond to your request, it is necessary to match the vehicle that Bruce McKay used on any particular day to that cell phone. I anticipate that this will take about two more weeks to do.

4. Town/police complaint procedures. These have been gathered and will be provided to you shortly.


5. All audio and video from the Tahoe, serial numbers on Kustom Signals Eyewitness equipment. This is another request that I was not aware of. Furthermore, the request seems rather broad as there is no timeline attached for parameters. If I have misunderstood this request, please let me know.

As to a response to the Mother’s Day Notice of Bad Faith, I just recently received material that was sent from the Grafton County Attorney’s Office and I will be filing a response after having reviewed that material.

Daniel J. Mullen, Esquire

By Blogger Christopher King, at 12:54 PM

Christopher King said...

Dear Attorney Mullen:

I want my documents, and I want them RIGHT NOW.

Tuesday, June 24, 2008 2:50 PM
From: "Christopher King" kingjurisdoctor@yahoo.com
To: robert.letourneau@leg.state.nh.us, martha.mcleod@leg.state.nh.us, graftonca@yahoo.com, townclerk@franconianh.org, dmullen@ranspell.com, police@franconianh.org, selectmen@franconianh.org, Marta.Modigliani@dos.nh.gov, USANH.Webmail@usdoj.gov, david.frydman@leg.state.nh.u

Frankly,

Your client's response -- or lack thereof -- is ridiculous.

http://christopher-king.blogspot.com/2008/06/dear-attorney-mullen-how-hard-is-it-to.html

Very truly yours,

Christopher King, J.D.

Anonymous said...

Are you sending these requests through the mail? E-mail requests are semi-irresponsible. Email is great for asking a clerk how much a document might cost... but for actual requests... are they even legal. They don't contain signatures.

Christopher King said...

2:58

Email is a valid method of service for an RSA 91-A request, silly.

Everyone else answered theirs with no problem, and Mullen already said he had the documents ready for me.

Duh.

Christopher King said...

Dear Sally: That's a Good One :)
Tuesday, June 24, 2008 7:42 PM
From: "Christopher King" kingjurisdoctor@yahoo.com
robert.letourneau@leg.state.nh.us, martha.mcleod@leg.state.nh.us, graftonca@yahoo.com, townclerk@franconianh.org, dmullen@ranspell.com, police@franconianh.org, selectmen@franconianh.org, Marta.Modigliani@dos.nh.gov, USANH.Webmail@usdoj.gov, david.frydman@leg.state.nh.us,

Dear Sally:

Your comment is a hoot and definitely drew a chuckle from me. I know it seems like a bloody nightmare but you know what? After Attorney Mullen provides the simple documents I've requested I'll be all set with you guys and then His Honor can go ahead and apportion the cost assessment after he rules on the Contempt issue for the almost not-found Troy Watts Bruce McKay Ethics Complaint that you didn't include to me when you provided the Sarah file several months ago :)

Best regards,

-The KingCaster

PS: The bloody nightmare happened on 5/11 after you guys continued to ignore the writing on the wall -- and in your complaint files -- about Bruce McKay.

+++++++++++++++

+++++++++++++++

From: selectmen@franconianh.orgTo: richmcleod1@verizon.net; carleenq@hotmail.com; cibvb@hotmail.comSubject: 6/16/08 Minutes & 6/23/08 AgendaDate: Fri, 20 Jun 2008 14:27:03 -0400

Hi Carl, Carleen & Rich,

Finally something not from Chris King! Hope you all have a good weekend and I'll see you on Monday.

Sally

Anonymous said...

A judge's immunity from liability only exists to the extent that the judge is doing the work of the Court. If it can be proven that an act of a judge was outside his judicial role, then his judicial immunity is compromised.


IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE


Elizabeth Juanita Campbell

Petitioner, Case No. 2007cv00275
vs.

Hooksett School District et.al,

Respondent,


MOTION TO RECUSE JUDGES Muirhead, and LaPlante, AND ORDER A NEW
RECOMMENDATION, THAT IS BASED UPON FACT AND LAW, AND UPHOLDS THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.
--------------------------------------------


COMES NOW, Petitioner Elizabeth Campbell and asks the Judges above to recuse themselves
and order a new fact finding phase and RECOMMENDATION. In support of this motion Petitioner states as
follows:


1) In it's decision on Report and Recommendation:
where the Petitioner asked the Court to order an emergency hearing, to cease the violation of petitioner's State and Constitutional rights, and all rights violated by the following: (1) The Hooksett police dept, (2) The Hooksett Memorial School, (3) The Dept of Education officials, (4)The Harborside Phesantwood Nursing home (Janet Dedo et al), (5) The DHHS (Michael Fitts et al), (6) DCYF (Mochrie et al), (7) The Nursing boards, N Patenaude et al), (8) Peter Wright, (9) Jeanne Kincaid (Drummond, Woodsum, and McMahan).
The Court found recommendation of the dismissal of my complaint to be the option, and this was seconded by the honorable judge Laplante. Judge Laplante does not have the authority to grant this motion.
This is absurd. The Court does have the authority to do the correct thing as justice demands. As the law and the constitution demands! This court knows this. It knows that this decision seconded by judge Laplante is deceptive, and not based upon legal principles.
The Plaintiff will remind the Court that just because she is
representing herself doesn't mean the Court has the right to deny her
due process. Although the Court may state the Court concluded the
case on that date of judge Laplante's decision, the Plaintiff still has the
right to make post decision motions and the Court has the duty and
responsibility to rule on these motions. The Plaintiff
expects the Judges to uphold the Constitution as they are sworn to do and
protect the fundamental rights to due process as guaranteed by the
14th Amendment.


2) Because the finding of the Court is in error the Court is obligated
to rule on the motion based on it's own merits. It is the courts
intent to deliberately deny this petitioner the right to have any of
her motions heard, based upon a pre-determined notion that is not grounded in law and fact. This Court is duty bound to hear and consider the legitimate motions of this petitioner.


3) There is evidence that this court in malice and wilful violations of the law has denied justice to this writer, in an attempt to come to certain conclusions. There is evidence that this court in making up statements contrary to evidence so stated, has contributed to the piling on effect aka “GANG RAPE” of a negro for fun. This petitioner's life has recently been threatened with murder by a Hooksett police officer; this petitioner is holding personally, judge magistrate Richard Muirhead, and judge Joseph Laplante responsible, should anything happen to me. Judge Laplante by his inactions to obvious and deliberate falsehoods of judge Muirhead, that he could clearly see from the evidence, as he knowingly reinforced lies, and the changed happenings by Muirhead, to dim the effect: This is surely a taste of what these Northern racist call “SOUTHERN JUSTICE.”
Both judges contributed to the denial of my State and Federal Rights by Jeanne Kincaid. Both these judges are in the event of my death, responsible for the lost of my life, and that of my son, in the event this occurs, as I had my life threatened by a Hooksett police officer who was following me, last Friday, in the Walmart parking lot of Hooksett, NH. This court which has made a mockery of American jurisprudence has ordered that Jeanne Kincaid continue to contact my employers each and every time with the main effect: I loose my home, and perhaps I will not be able to continue to seek justice for the many violations and injustices of basic human rights: My State and Constitutional Rights. Most of all, they are hoping that I would have to leave Hooksett. I guess you will kill me first. I WILL NOT LEAVE. I WILL NOT LOOSE MY HOME. WHAT WILL YOU DO? COMMENCE THE KILL?
No evidence was presented that these violations and events did not occur: (for example) Indeed this Plaintiff has the evidence that SHE WAS TOTALLY BANNED FROM THE HOOKSETT MEMORIAL SCHOOL, CONTRARY TO THE DELIBERATE AND MALICIOUS LIES OF JUDGE MUIRHEAD, that there was a “limited” ban; THAT SHE HAS BEEN ABUSED, AND BATTERED, AND INFACT, HER LIFE HAS BEEN RECENTLY THREATENED BY A HOOKSETT POLICE OFFICER, WHO HAS INTERPRETED JUDGE MUIRHEAD'S CONTEMPT OF THE LAW AS AN AGREEMENT THAT THIS NEGRO HAS NO RIGHTS AND CAN BE THREATENED, ABUSED, AND EVENTUALLY MURDERED.
This Plaintiff offered strong evidence: Juxtaposed to judge Muirhead's “Report and Recommendation” that elucidates the contempt, animousity, bias, and the great misfortune of injustice brought to bare on this innocent plaintiff by the Federal judge, who reminds the average person that his actions are not the conduct becoming of a judge, but that of a criminal. Judge Muirhead DELIBERATELY LIES, AGAIN, AND AGAIN, AND IS IN CONTEMPT OF THE LAW! THIS JUDGE MASQUERADES IN THE CLOTH OF BLACKNESS TO LEND CREDIBILITY OF SERENITY, IMPORTANCE, REVERANCE AND RESPECT. INSTEAD, HE SHOULD BE DRESSED IN THE CLOTHING OF WHITE WITH A CONED HAT MASQUERADING WHO, AND WHAT HE REALLY IS!
THIS PETITIONER IS ABOVE REPROACH IN ALL HER DEALINGS, AND REFUSES TO BE SILENCED: I REFUSED TO SHUT UP ABOUT THE ABUSE MY SON FACED BY CAROL SOUCY; THE PORN SENT BY PETER FOLEY, THE LIES LAID DOWN BY THE INFIRMED JANET DEDO (ONCE AGENT FOR THE STATE);THE CORRUPTION AND SHAMED FACED AND DISPICABLE CONDUCT OF MICHAEL FITTS; THE HARASSMENT AND THREATENING USE OF THE POLICE BY MS.MOCHRIE; THE PATHOS OF MARY MORAN AND AN ELDERLY RACIST NUNN; THE CONTEMPTIBLE VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW BY JACQULINE PERRA; AND THE CONTINUED VIOLATIONS, ABUSE AND MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE BY JEANNE KINCAID AS THE STATE AND GOVERNOR, AND CORRUPT JUDGES LOOK ON.
If the Court is to let stand it's Order of the dismissal of my complaint, and the termination of my rights despite over-whelming evidence because it too is angry about my speech: my notations of Dr. Frances Cress Welsing, and my determination to speak....to exercise my First Amendment Rights........ then justice
demands that the Court state how it came to the conclusion that the
Plaintiff should comply with the Order of the Court.
The Plaintiff has made the attempt to give the Court the
opportunity to either fix it's error of dismissing the Plaintiff's Complaint, or at least explain it's reasoning. I say Respectfully, that the court MUST DO EITHER. If the court does neither, then one can only conclude, REASONABLE people can only conclude that it is the intention of the court to deliberately and maliciously DENY THE HUMAN, STATE, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THIS PLAINTIFF.
The authority of the Court comes from the Constitution and the Laws
passed by the Legislature. These documents define the role and
authority of the FederalCourt and the duties of the Judges that serve
there. It is the job of the Court to conduct preliminary evaluations into complaints to decipher whether they are with merit or not. and to make anhonest attempt at a fair and equitable judgement. It is the duty of
the Judges on the Court to serve the Public and to bring cases before
them to a conclusion fairly. It is the duty of the Court to correct any clear and
obvious error when brought to the attention of the Court. And it is
the responsibility of the Court to ensure as best it can that justice
be served in a fair and equitable manner. Judges take an oath to
uphold the Constitution and are expected to abide by the Rules of
Professional Conduct.
As a Judge in Federal Court it is your duty to do the work of a Federal
Court Judge and only that. The law does not give the Judges of Federal
Court the authority to deliberately ruin individuals, and make null and void their State and Constitutional Rights. Such an act would been seen by a reasonable person to be an act that is
clearly outside all judicial authority. Clearly a FederalCourt judge
does not have the right under the Law to use his position and
immunities to shield him from malicious acts that are clearly outside
his scope of authority.
5) The authority of the Court exists so that judges can do the work of
the Court that it is mandated to do under Law. If the Court isn't
doing it's mandated work then the Court has no authority. In Federal
Court and at this initial stage, the mandate of the Court is to look at cases fairly and equitably.
It is the responsibility of the magistrate judge to recommend the case to the judge, after he uses the scope and practice of the law. After he arrives at conclusions based in principle and fact. AND IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE JUDGE NOT TO RUBBER STAMP, OR STAMP TO GET ALONG BECAUSE HE IS NEW TO THE COURT, BUT RATHER TO DISPENSE JUSTICE.
As part of the process the judge is required under the Law to make a Decision, that is fair, and within the scope of justice.
But the Judge doesn't have the authority to make just any decision and
walk away. The Judge is obligated under the Law to make decisions that
grounded in truth, and fact, not maliciousness, and contempt. Not personal animosity; but principles rooted in law, devoid of emtions and preference, and wishes, and should haves: When it is pointed out that he has “mistakenly”
made a decision that isn't possible it is his duty to correct it.
To make a decision that the Judge, or any reasonable person, knows is
based upon half-truths, and pretense of how things SHOULD BE; and to refuse to correct it will not lead to the
fulfilling of the work the Court is mandated to perform. And if the
Judge isn't acting in a manner that would lead to the fulfillment of
his mandate, he is acting in the absence of all judicial authority.
In this case, your honor, it has clearly been pointed out to the
Court in a manner that any reasonable person can understand, that
Judge muirhead's decisions are rooted in inaccuracies and fantasies. Despite the clear bold evidence! That the Court has made obvious “errors”
that is apparent to any reasonable person. These obvious errors were
brought to the attention of the Court and were deliberately ignored.
The Court is now asked to explain these errors, and correct them!
THE COURT HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CORRECT ITS ACTIONS!
In light of this behavior of the Judges, the Plaintiff can only
conclude that the Judges are on a mission that has nothing to do with
the job the Law mandates them to perform. And if the Judges are not doing
the work of the Court then the Judges DO NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY OR
IMMUNITIES OF THE Court THEIR DECISIONS ARE THEREFORE DEFECTIVE AND INVALID!
Because of the obvious errors in the Decision, it is the
Plaintiff's position that no decision has been made.
6) If the Court decides that it has the right to deny the Plaintiff
due process by refusing to consider her preajudicatory motions, then the
Judges are refusing to do the work of the Court. If the Judges are refusing
to do the work of the Court then they lack the authority and
immunities of the Court. If the Judges can not or will not perform their
duties as Judge, then they are obligated under Law to recuse themselves and
get out of the way of justice.
A Judge who stands in the way of justice and the law is acting
outside of all judicial authority and thereby waives his rights to
immunity from civil liability. The 14th Amendment guarantees the
fundamental rights of citizens to due process and such rights require
strict scrutiny of the Court. The Plaintiff therefore puts the Court
on notice that she intends to defend her rights and to
hold the Court liable for acts the Court takes against her
that are done in the absence of judicial authority.
WHEREFORE, in light of the fact that the Judges are either unwilling or
unable to perform their duty as mandated by the Constitution and the Law,
Plaintiff prays the Judges will recuse themselves and order a new assessment phase.


--------------------------------
Elizabeth Campbell* Plaintiff.

Anonymous said...

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE



Elizabeth Juanita Campbell

V. Civil N0. 07-cv-275-JL

Hooksett School District, et al. Opinion N0. 2008 DNH 027


Parent Response to Report and Recommendation

THIS PARENT, IS IN TOTAL DISAGREEMENT WITH THE CONCLUDINGS OF THIS JUDGE MAGISTRATE.

This parent re alleges all addendums to this complaint, and ask that all

defendants be re-submitted.


first I shall give a brief over view of my case, followed by an excerpt from Wright'slaw, then I shall respond to the magistrate judge's Response, then I shall again, state the applicable law and violations of my complaint.


Brief Overview of my Complaint

This parent after 3.5 exhausting years of asking the Hooksett Memorial School to implement son's IEP had had enough;and especially when confronting the reality that son had entered the 4th grade where school work would become more challenging. It was not until this parent was told by her former attorney Raymond Foss, that Carol Soucy, Principal of the Hooksett Memorial school (said to him in a rare moment of honesty) that “she was the only parent asking for a syllabus.” The implication being that since no other parent asked for one, then my son's INDIVIDUALIZED EDUCATION PLAN, COULD BE IGNORED. When attorney Foss followed up this statement of hers with, “Was she wrong in asking for the syllabus”? Silence was, and continues to be the response: AND IGNORED, WAS THE IMPLIMENTATION OF MY SON'S IEP FOR 3.5 YEARS. MS. SOUCY WAS CLEVER AND CRUEL AS SHE AND MS. PERRA KEPT UP WITH FALSE PROMISES TO THIS PARENT. UNTIL THIS PARENT MADE GOOD TO THE EMAILED THREATS OF LEGAL REDRESS.
Subsequently, this parent was subjected to Retaliation first directly from Ms. Soucy as she emotionally abused my son on February 16th, 2007. Ms. Soucy placed my son in a room adjacent to her office, where she closed the door, and denied my son from going to the bathroom, or getting lunch. Ms. Soucy ignored my son's call for help as she caused great fear and panic within the mind of this 9 year old boy who later told me that he was fearful of what would happen next. Ms Soucy terrorized and abused my son. I discovered my son in a state of shock when he came home that evening: He had reddened eyes, there were tear stains about his face, some dried....he was incontinent of urine, and it had gotten into his shoes. I made a complaint to DCYF, and subsequently the complaint was sent to Judith Fillion who did not investigate it, but sat on it, and, when I inquired of the results of the investigation, Ms. Fillion told me that I would have to get a subpoena. Ultimately, the DOE (Dept of Ed) got a worker who would claimed that he was assigned to investigate the case all along. This story is full of holes. is using NH State law to hide an injustice against my son!
Ms. Soucy gave out this parent's private and unlisted telephone number to a school bus driver without there being an Emergency; NEXT, SHE DENIED ME THAT BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL SAFEGUARD OF IDEA....THAT RIGHT TO ATTEND AND BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF MY SON'S IEP TEAM MEETING: THAT PARTICULAR MEETING WHICH CAME TOGETHER AND WITHOUT MY INPUT, OR MY ATTORNEY'S INPUT, despite the school's knowledge of his in-volvment, his email, fax, and telephone numbers and addresses. Despite this knowledge, the all too common illegalities and corruption which would become common-place took hold. Ms. Soucy et al., Made THEIR ILLEGAL DECISION TO DISMISS MY SON FROM SPEECH THERAPY.
Next came the unprofessional and subjective Ms. Esau, who made it clear to me that she did not like Rush Limbaugh, and did not agree with my speech in email to school throughout the years; a woman who literally wanted to see the word syllabus written down (in order to “assist her in identifying my son's IEP): A woman who (either pretended, or knew) that the class syllabus WAS NOT MY SON'S IEP. A woman who stated that I was already getting the syllabus, alas son's IEP was being IMPLEMENTED: THIS WOULD TAKE THE ENTRANCE, AND INVOLVMENT OF ATTORNEY FOSS, FOR THE REALITY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IEP. A WOMAN WHO HAD NOT MET WITH ME, BUT WAS ANGRY WITH ME (AS SHE WAS PRIVIED TO MY POLITICL SPEECH OF ALL THESE YEARS, ...I WOULD COME TO REALIZE THAT IN NEW HAMPSHIRE, AMENDMENT 1 DOES NOT INCLUDE NEGROES, BLACKS). A WOMAN WHO BAITED ME, ASKING ME “WHY DIDN'T YOU MAKE THE SCHOOL PUT THE WORD SYLLABUS ONTO THE IEP.” I SIMPLY TOLD HER THAT I COULD NOT MAKE THE SCHOOL DO ANYTHING THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO DO...what do you want me to do, put a gun to their heads and make them do it?.. I've got you involved and I'm looking for an attorney.” Ms. Esau knew that my statements to her were rhetorical. I was exasperated by the ignorance of her question, but she was sly like a fox.
Soon, the School district, or, Ms. Esau, would involved the Hooksett Police: Subsequently, Officer War hall spat in my face; invaded, my personal space, held me hostage. Ms that I could not email, call, visit, or fax the school, again, or I would be arrested. Attorney Foss had to intervene so that my son would be allowed to go to school if he missed the bus outside our street, later Ms. War hall, in an attempt to cover up what she clearly told me, said that she told me that I could come to the school as long as I remained in my car. Wonder why attorney Foss intervened to change this! This was a clear violation of my civil Rights..they were judge and executioner. Later Ms. War hall came to my home uninvited: she was accompanied by a male office, they banged on my door for about 22 mins, disturbed my piece, harassed and threatened me. I would learn from Linda War hall, that she had access to my son's record, again, A CLEAR VIOLATION OF FERPA. Officer War hall along with The VERY DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE TOWN OF HOOKSETT, Kimberly Chabot, CAME TO MY SON'S DUE PROCESS HEARING UNINVITED BY ME, BUT INVITED BY PETER FOLEY, JEANNE KINCAID AND CAROL SOUCY. MY SON CANNOT GIVE CONSENT TO INVITING THEM. MY RIGHTS, AND THAT OF MY SON TO PRIVACY WAS BREACHED.
Soon the School district would retain Ms. Kincaid. I would discover pure EVIL. Ms Kincaid thought that she could bully me into not seeking justice for my son and self, appease her wallet. Ms. Kincaid pretended (first lie) that the school had placed an offer on the table: THIS IS A RIGHT, MANDATED BY IDEA, IT IS, AND OF IDEA, NOTHING TO DO WITH THE SCHOOL. But this was mild in comparison to what Ms. Kincaid had in store for me.
Prior to going to DUE PROCESS, I started receiving pornography via email. I also started sending them along to attorney Foss who was still representing me. The porn was mild at first. One day, an email address I recognized to be that of Peter Foley......hearing officer, was attached to one of the porn.
I went to the Due Process Hearing, and predictable via the actions of Ms. Kincaid and Mr. Foley, the outcome was not beneficial to us.













































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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Print this page
JACOB WINKELMAN, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians,
Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al.,

v.

PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Argued: February 27, 2007
Decided: May 21, 2007
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some four years ago, Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman, parents of five children, became involved in lengthy administrative and legal proceedings. They had sought review related to concerns they had over whether their youngest child, 6-year-old Jacob, would progress well at Pleasant Valley Elementary School, which is part of the Parma City School District in Parma, Ohio.
Jacob has autism spectrum disorder and is covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). His parents worked with the school district to develop an individualized education program (IEP), as required by the Act. All concede that Jacob’s parents had the statutory right to contribute to this process and, when agreement could not be reached, to participate in administrative proceedings including what the Act refers to as an “impartial due process hearing.” §1415(f)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
The disagreement at the center of the current dispute concerns the procedures to be followed when parents and their child, dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hearing, seek further review in a United States District Court. The question is whether parents, either on their own behalf or as representatives of the child, may proceed in court unrepresented by counsel though they are not trained or licensed as attorneys. Resolution of this issue requires us to examine and explain the provisions of IDEA to determine if it accords to parents rights of their own that can be vindicated in court proceedings, or alternatively, whether the Act allows them, in their status as parents, to represent their child in court proceedings.
I
Respondent Parma City School District, a participant in IDEA’s educational spending program, accepts federal funds for assistance in the education of children with disabilities. As a condition of receiving funds, it must comply with IDEA’s mandates. IDEA requires that the school district provide Jacob with a “free appropriate public education,” which must operate in accordance with the IEP that Jacob’s parents, along with school officials and other individuals, develop as members of Jacob’s “IEP Team.” Brief for Petitioners 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The school district proposed an IEP for the 2003–2004 school year that would have placed Jacob at a public elementary school. Regarding this IEP as deficient under IDEA, Jacob’s nonlawyer parents availed themselves of the administrative review provided by IDEA. They filed a complaint alleging respondent had failed to provide Jacob with a free appropriate public education; they appealed the hearing officer’s rejection of the claims in this complaint to a state-level review officer; and after losing that appeal they filed, on their own behalf and on behalf of Jacob, a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In reliance upon 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) they challenged the administrative decision, alleging, among other matters: that Jacob had not been provided with a free appropriate public education; that his IEP was inadequate; and that the school district had failed to follow procedures mandated by IDEA. Pending the resolution of these challenges, the Winkelmans had enrolled Jacob in a private school at their own expense. They had also obtained counsel to assist them with certain aspects of the proceedings, although they filed their federal complaint, and later their appeal, without the aid of an attorney. The Winkelmans’ complaint sought reversal of the administrative decision, reimbursement for private-school expenditures and attorney’s fees already incurred, and, it appears, declaratory relief.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding it had provided Jacob with a free appropriate public education. Petitioners, proceeding without counsel, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Relying on its recent decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist., 409 F. 3d 753 (2005), the Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal unless they obtained counsel to represent Jacob. See Order in No. 05–3886 (Nov. 4, 2005), App. A to Pet. for Cert. 1a. In Cavanaugh the Court of Appeals had rejected the proposition that IDEA allows nonlawyer parents raising IDEA claims to proceed pro se in federal court. The court ruled that the right to a free appropriate public education “belongs to the child alone,” 409 F. 3d, at 757, not to both the parents and the child. It followed, the court held, that “any right on which the [parents] could proceed on their own behalf would be derivative” of the child’s right, ibid., so that parents bringing IDEA claims were not appearing on their own behalf, ibid. See also 28 U. S. C. §1654 (allowing parties to prosecute their own claims pro se). As for the parents’ alternative argument, the court held, nonlawyer parents cannot litigate IDEA claims on behalf of their child because IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor children.409 F. 3d, at 756. As the court in Cavanaugh acknowledged, its decision brought the Sixth Circuit in direct conflict with the First Circuit, which had concluded, under a theory of “statutory joint rights,” that the Act accords to parents the right to assert IDEA claims on their own behalf. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School Dist., 346 F. 3d 247, 249, 250 (CA1 2003).
Petitioners sought review in this Court. In light of the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a nonlawyer parent of a child with a disability may prosecute IDEA actions pro se in federal court, we granted certiorari. 549 U. S. ___ (2006). Compare Cavanaugh, supra, with Maroni, supra; see also Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527 (CA7 2006); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225 (CA3 1998); Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576 (CA11 1997).
II
Our resolution of this case turns upon the significance of IDEA’s interlocking statutory provisions. Petitioners’ primary theory is that the Act makes parents real parties in interest to IDEA actions, not “mer[e] guardians of their children’s rights.” Brief for Petitioners 16. If correct, this allows Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman back into court, for there is no question that a party may represent his or her own interests in federal court without the aid of counsel. See 28 U. S. C. §1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . .”). Petitioners cannot cite a specific provision in IDEA mandating in direct and explicit terms that parents have the status of real parties in interest. They instead base their argument on a comprehensive reading of IDEA. Taken as a whole, they contend, the Act leads to the necessary conclusion that parents have independent, enforceable rights. Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 60 (2004)). Respondent, accusing petitioners of “knit[ting] together various provisions pulled from the crevices of the statute” to support these claims, Brief for Respondent 19, reads the text of IDEA to mean that any redressable rights under the Act belong only to children, id., at 19–40.
We agree that the text of IDEA resolves the question presented. We recognize, in addition, that a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statutory scheme. See Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). Turning to the current version of IDEA, which the parties agree governs this case, we begin with an overview of the relevant statutory provisions.
A
The goals of IDEA include “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” and “ensur[ing] that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20 U. S. C. §§1400(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). To this end, the Act includes provisions governing four areas of particular relevance to the Winkelmans’ claim: procedures to be followed when developing a child’s IEP; criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a child; mechanisms for review that must be made available when there are objections to the IEP or to other aspects of IDEA proceedings; and the requirement in certain circumstances that States reimburse parents for various expenses. See generally §§1412(a)(10), 1414, 1415. Although our discussion of these four areas does not identify all the illustrative provisions, we do take particular note of certain terms that mandate or otherwise describe parental involvement.
IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a disability, see §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d), with parents playing “a significant role” in this process, Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53 (2005). Parents serve as members of the team that develops the IEP. §1414(d)(1)(B). The “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” must be considered by the team. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). IDEA accords parents additional protections that apply throughout the IEP process. See, e.g., §1414(d)(4)(A) (requiring the IEP Team to revise the IEP when appropriate to address certain information provided by the parents); §1414(e) (requiring States to “ensure that the parents of [a child with a disability] are members of any group that makes decisions on the educational placement of their child”). The statute also sets up general procedural safeguards that protect the informed involvement of parents in the development of an education for their child. See, e.g., §1415(a) (requiring States to “establish and maintain procedures … to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education”); §1415(b)(1) (mandating that States provide an opportunity for parents to examine all relevant records). See generally §§1414, 1415. A central purpose of the parental protections is to facilitate the provision of a “ ‘free appropriate public education,’ ” §1401(9), which must be made available to the child “in conformity with the [IEP],” §1401(9)(D).
The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” pursuant to an IEP to be an educational instruction “specially designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” §1401(29), coupled with any additional
“ ‘related services’ ” that are “required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from [that instruction],” §1401(26)(A). See also §1401(9). The education must, among other things, be provided “under public supervision and direction,” “meet the standards of the State educational agency,” and “include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.” Ibid. The instruction must, in addition, be provided at “no cost to parents.” §1401(29). See generally Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176 (1982) (discussing the meaning of “free appropriate public education” as used in the statutory precursor to IDEA).
When a party objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related matter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: It requires that a State provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6). By presenting a complaint a party is able to pursue a process of review that, as relevant, begins with a preliminary meeting “where the parents of the child discuss their complaint” and the local educational agency “is provided the opportunity to [reach a resolution].” §1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV). If the agency “has not resolved the complaint to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days,” §1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), the parents may request an “impartial due process hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), which must be conducted either by the local educational agency or by the state educational agency, ibid., and where a hearing officer will resolve issues raised in the complaint, §1415(f)(3).
IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,” and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate public education” only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” §§1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).

If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” §1415(g)(1). Once the state educational agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A); see also §1415(i)(1).
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost recovery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circumstances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disability] for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Second, it sets forth rules governing when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees. See §1415(i)(3)(B). Included in this section is a provision allowing an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.
The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in a manner that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents will be the parties bringing the administrative complaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we refer also to §1415(b)(8) (requiring a state educational agency to “develop a model form to assist parents in filing a complaint”); §1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an agency must provide to a “parent’s due process complaint notice”); and §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “the parent’s complaint”). A wide range of review is available: Administrative complaints may be brought with respect to “any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(b)(6)(A). Claims raised in these complaints are then resolved at impartial due process hearings, where, again, the statute makes clear that parents will be participating as parties. See generally supra, at 7–8. See also §1415(f)(3)(C) (indicating “[a] parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing” within a certain period of time); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (referring to “a parent’s right to a due process hearing”). The statute then grants “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] . . . the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A).
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection the moment the administrative proceedings end. Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights accorded to them once the time comes to file a civil action. Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests. In respondent’s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than “collateral tools related to the child’s underlying substantive rights—not freestanding or independently enforceable rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). The word “rights” in the quoted language refers to the rights of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical structure would make no sense.
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(a). It presumes parents have rights of their own when it defines how States might provide for the transfer of the “rights accorded to parents” by IDEA, §1415(m)(1)(B), and it prohibits the raising of certain challenges “[n]otwithstanding any other individual right of action that a parent or student may maintain under [the relevant provisions of IDEA],” §§1401(10)(E), 1412(a)(14)(E). To adopt respondent’s reading of the statute would require an interpretation of these statutory provisions (and others) far too strained to be correct.
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, respondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding that the Act’s “references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child’s incapacity.” Doe v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4 1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’ rights as referring in implicit terms to the child’s rights — which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights accorded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we disagree that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–401 (1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law, then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without question a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” §1400(c)(1).
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Congress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights concerning the education of their children. We instead interpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent’s argument has persuaded some Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party aggrieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under this view the causes of action available to a parent might relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands, see, e.g., §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The argument supporting this conclusion proceeds as follows: Because a “party aggrieved” is, by definition, entitled to a remedy, and parents are, under IDEA, only entitled to certain procedures and reimbursements as remedies, a parent cannot be a “party aggrieved” with regard to any claim not implicating these limited matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions we have recited. True, there are provisions in IDEA stating parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find little support for the inference that parents are excluded by implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa. Compare, e.g., §1411(e)(3)(E) (barring States from using certain funds for costs associated with actions “brought on behalf of a child” but failing to acknowledge that actions might also be brought on behalf of a parent) with §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” but failing to acknowledge that a child might also be a prevailing party). Without more, then, the language in IDEA confirming that parents enjoy particular procedural and reimbursement-related rights does not resolve whether they are also entitled to enforce IDEA’s other mandates, including the one most fundamental to the Act: the provision of a free appropriate public education to a child with a disability.
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. Among other things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when it formulates the IEP. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). The IEP, in turn, sets the boundaries of the central entitlement provided by IDEA: It defines a “ ‘free appropriate public education’ ” for that parent’s child. §1401(9).
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6)(A). To resolve these challenges a hearing officer must make a decision based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E). When this hearing has been conducted by a local educational agency rather than a state educational agency, “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision” to the state educational agency. §1415(g)(1). Judicial review follows, authorized by a broadly worded provision phrased in the same terms used to describe the prior stage of review: “[a]ny party aggrieved” may bring “a civil action.” §1415(i)(2)(A).

These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party aggrieved” for purposes of §1415(i)(2) with regard to “any matter” implicating these rights. See §1415(b)(6)(A). The status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that relate to procedure and cost recovery. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and expansive system of review established by the Act. Cf. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U. S. 66, 73 (1999) (looking to IDEA’s “overall statutory scheme” to interpret its provisions).
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous results that would follow were we to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. The statute’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child, see, e.g., §1415(f)(3)(E), see also §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and it is difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not. Were we nevertheless to recognize a distinction of this sort it would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might in practice differentiate between these matters. It is, in addition, out of accord with the statute’s design to interpret the Act to require that parents prove the substantive inadequacy of their child’s education as a predicate for obtaining, for example, reimbursement under §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), yet to prevent them from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child with an educational program demonstrated to be an appropriate one. The adequacy of the educational program is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provisions of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we decline to infer them.
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a remedy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at public expense,” §1401(9)(A), including specially designed instruction “at no cost to parents,” §1401(29). Parents may seek to enforce this mandate through the federal courts, we conclude, because among the rights they enjoy is the right to a free appropriate public education for their child. Under the countervailing view, which would make a parent’s ability to enforce IDEA dependant on certain procedural and reimbursement-related rights, a parent whose disabled child has not received a free appropriate public education would have recourse in the federal courts only under two circumstances: when the parent happens to have some claim related to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to incur, and has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child’s education would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appropriate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent. What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to provide adequate instruction to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). See, e.g., §1415(e)(2) (requiring that States implement procedures to ensure parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that mediation procedures not be “used to deny or delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing . . . or to deny any other rights afforded under this subchapter”); cf. §1400(c)(3) (noting IDEA’s success in “ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children access to a free appropriate public education”).
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reasoning we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail without overcoming a further difficulty. Citing our opinion in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___ (2006), respondent argues that statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, such as IDEA, must provide “ ‘clear notice’ ” before they can burden a State with some new condition, obligation, or liability. Brief for Respondent 41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition to the States. See id., at 40–49.
Respondent’s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Arlington we addressed whether IDEA required States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. “[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) ). The question to be answered in Arlington, therefore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We found it did not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might have more force: A determination by the Court that some distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations. But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter, increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to defend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause. Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in certain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action . . . for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). This provision allows some relief when a party has proceeded in violation of these standards.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal traditions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the education of one’s child; and, what is more, Congress has found that “the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home.” §1400(c)(5).
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), when they seek reimbursement for private school expenses or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they seek a judicial determination that their child’s free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA and the general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The latter, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1654, provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (Emphasis added.) The IDEA’s right-to-sue provision, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of a hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the [administrative] complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when parents are “parties aggrieved” under the IDEA, they are “parties” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1654, entitled to sue on their own behalf.[1]
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 12. This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of filing their own cases in federal court.
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as relevant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of rights.[2] First, under certain circumstances “a court or a hearing officer may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents” for private school expenditures “if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school district] had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Second, parents are accorded a variety of procedural protections, both during the development of their child’s individualized education program (IEP), see, e.g., §1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (parents are members of their child’s IEP team); §1415(b)(1) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and participate in IEP meetings), and in any subsequent administrative challenges, see, e.g., §§1415(b)(6), (8) (parents may file administrative due process complaints). It is clear that parents may object to procedural violations at the administrative due process hearing, see §1415(b)(6)(A), and that a hearing officer may provide relief to parents for certain procedural infractions, see §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Because the rights to reimbursement and to the various procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are “parties aggrieved” when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to vindicate them.[3]
The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge the substantive adequacy of their child’s FAPE — so that parents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See ante, at 11–16. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs, participating States must provide a “free appropriate public education … to all children with disabilities … .” §1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The statute is replete with references to the fact that a FAPE belongs to the child. See, e.g., §1400(d)(1)(A) (IDEA designed “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education”); §1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to “the right of a child” to “receive a free appropriate public education”); §1411(e)(3)(F)(i) (same); §1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) (referring to an agency “that is responsible for making a free appropriate public education available to a child”); §1415(b)(6)(A) (referring to “the provision of a free appropriate public education to [a] child”). The parents of a disabled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents have no right to the education itself.[4]
The Court concedes, as it must, that while the IDEA gives parents the right to reimbursement and procedural protection in explicit terms, it does not do so for the supposed right to the education itself. Ante, at 12. The obvious inference to be drawn from the statute’s clear and explicit conferral of discrete types of rights upon parents and children, respectively, is that it does not by accident confer the parent-designated rights upon children, or the children-designated rights upon parents. The Court believes, however, that “the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on [this] implicatio[n].” Ibid. That conclusion is in error. Nothing in “the statute,” undermines the obvious “implication” of Congress’s scheme. What the Court relies upon for its conclusion that parents have a substantive right to a FAPE is not the “statutory structure,” ante, at 13, but rather the myriad procedural guarantees accorded to parents in the administrative process, see ibid. But allowing parents, by means of these guarantees, to help shape the contours of their child’s education is simply not the same as giving them the right to that education. Nor can the Court sensibly rely on the provisions governing due process hearings and administrative appeals, the various provisions that refer to the “parent’s complaint,” see, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), or the fact that the right-to-sue provision, §1415(i)(2)(A), refers to the administrative complaint, which in turn allows parents to challenge “any matter” relating to the provision of a FAPE, §1415(b)(6)(A). These provisions prove nothing except what all parties concede: that parents may represent their child pro se at the administrative level. See Brief for Petitioners 17–18, 40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief for Respondent 13, 44; see also Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Parents thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights they are.[5] The Court’s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA’s “text and structure” (by which it means the statute’s procedural protections), the Court announces the startling proposition that, in fact, the “IDEA does not differentiate … between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents.” Ante, at 13. If that were so, the Court could have spared us its painful effort to craft a distinctive parental right out of scattered procedural provisions. But of course it is not so. The IDEA quite clearly differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Congress specifically indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are separate from and independent of their children’s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court … may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment”? §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added); see also Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (“The right of reimbursement runs to the parents”). Does the Court believe that a child has a procedural right under §§1414(d)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which gives parents the power to excuse an IEP team member from attending an IEP meeting? The IDEA does not remotely envision communal “family” rights.
The Court believes that because parents must prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reimbursement, §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), and because the suitability of a FAPE may also be at issue when procedural violations are alleged, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), it is “out of accord with the statute’s design” to “prevent [parents] from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child” with a FAPE. Ante, at 14. That is a total non sequitur. That Congress has required parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of their child’s FAPE in order to vindicate their own rights says nothing about whether parents possess an underlying right to education. The Court insists that the right to a FAPE is the right “most fundamental to the Act.” Ante, at 12. Undoubtedly so, but that sheds no light upon whom the right belongs to, and hence upon who can sue in their own right. Congress has used the phrase “party aggrieved,” and it is this Court’s job to apply that language, not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between parental and child rights will prove difficult to administer. I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims, but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006); Collingsru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581, n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggesting that this majority rule has caused any confusion in practice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’ and children’s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injustice,” ante, at 15, since parents who do not seek reimbursement or allege procedural violations would be “without a remedy,” ante, at 14–15. That, of course, is not true. They will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindicate their children’s rights: the power to bring suit, represented by counsel. But even indulging the Court’s perception that it is unfair to allow some but not all IDEA parents to proceed pro se, that complaint is properly addressed to Congress, which structured the rights as it has, and limited suit to “party aggrieved.” And there are good reasons for it to have done so. Pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts — and on defendants, in this case the schools and school districts that must hire their own lawyers. Since pro se complaints are prosecuted essentially for free, without screening by knowledgeable attorneys, they are much more likely to be unmeritorious. And for courts to figure them out without the assistance of plaintiff’s counsel is much more difficult and time-consuming. In both categories of pro se parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Actions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous, since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money for private education without some solid reason to believe the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive record-review that characterizes suits challenging the suitability of a FAPE.
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural violations, and requested a declaration that their child’s FAPE was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 3. I agree with the Court that they may proceed pro se with respect to the first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with respect to the third.
Notes
[1] As the Court notes, ante, at 2, 18, petitioners also argue that even if parents do not have their own rights under the statute, they nonetheless may act on behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay parents from representing their children in court, a manifestation of the more general common-law rule that nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of another. See Brief for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also, e.g., Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.
[2] Because the grant of those rights is clear, and because I find no statutory basis for any other rights, I need not decide whether the Spending Clause’s “clear notice” requirement is applicable here. Cf. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 4).
[3] Of course when parents assert procedural violations, they must also allege that those violations adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Under Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a procedural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of the proceeding to which the violation pertains, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 571–578 (1992), here the parents’ interest in having their child receive an appropriate education.
[4] Nor can a parental right to education be justified, as the Court attempts, see ante, at 14–15, on the theory that the IDEA gives parents a legal right to free schooling for their child. Parents acquire such a right (in limited circumstances) only when they enroll their child in a private institution. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
[5] Contrary to indications in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 13, and to the apparent language of the statute, a hearing officer does not always render a decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). That provision is “[s]ubject to clause (ii),” ibid., which provides that “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation” a hearing officer can grant relief if “the procedural inadequacies … significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child,” §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). It is true that a hearing officer who accepts such an allegation nominally grants relief by concluding that the child did not receive a FAPE, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), but it is clear from the structure of the statute that this is not a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, but rather the label attached to a finding of procedural defect. Petitioners agree with me on this point. See Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 23. See also 20 U. S. C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this section”). In any event, even if a hearing officer was required to render a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, that feature of the statute still gives no clue as to whether parents’ vindication of that substantive right at the administrative stage is on their own behalf or on behalf of the child.
End of Decision

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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JACOB WINKELMAN, a minor, by and through his parents and legal guardians,
Jeff and Sandee Winkelman, et al.,

v.

PARMA CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Argued: February 27, 2007
Decided: May 21, 2007
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
Some four years ago, Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman, parents of five children, became involved in lengthy administrative and legal proceedings. They had sought review related to concerns they had over whether their youngest child, 6-year-old Jacob, would progress well at Pleasant Valley Elementary School, which is part of the Parma City School District in Parma, Ohio.
Jacob has autism spectrum disorder and is covered by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (Act or IDEA), 84 Stat. 175, as amended, 20 U. S. C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV). His parents worked with the school district to develop an individualized education program (IEP), as required by the Act. All concede that Jacob’s parents had the statutory right to contribute to this process and, when agreement could not be reached, to participate in administrative proceedings including what the Act refers to as an “impartial due process hearing.” §1415(f)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
The disagreement at the center of the current dispute concerns the procedures to be followed when parents and their child, dissatisfied with the outcome of the due process hearing, seek further review in a United States District Court. The question is whether parents, either on their own behalf or as representatives of the child, may proceed in court unrepresented by counsel though they are not trained or licensed as attorneys. Resolution of this issue requires us to examine and explain the provisions of IDEA to determine if it accords to parents rights of their own that can be vindicated in court proceedings, or alternatively, whether the Act allows them, in their status as parents, to represent their child in court proceedings.
I
Respondent Parma City School District, a participant in IDEA’s educational spending program, accepts federal funds for assistance in the education of children with disabilities. As a condition of receiving funds, it must comply with IDEA’s mandates. IDEA requires that the school district provide Jacob with a “free appropriate public education,” which must operate in accordance with the IEP that Jacob’s parents, along with school officials and other individuals, develop as members of Jacob’s “IEP Team.” Brief for Petitioners 3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The school district proposed an IEP for the 2003–2004 school year that would have placed Jacob at a public elementary school. Regarding this IEP as deficient under IDEA, Jacob’s nonlawyer parents availed themselves of the administrative review provided by IDEA. They filed a complaint alleging respondent had failed to provide Jacob with a free appropriate public education; they appealed the hearing officer’s rejection of the claims in this complaint to a state-level review officer; and after losing that appeal they filed, on their own behalf and on behalf of Jacob, a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio. In reliance upon 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) they challenged the administrative decision, alleging, among other matters: that Jacob had not been provided with a free appropriate public education; that his IEP was inadequate; and that the school district had failed to follow procedures mandated by IDEA. Pending the resolution of these challenges, the Winkelmans had enrolled Jacob in a private school at their own expense. They had also obtained counsel to assist them with certain aspects of the proceedings, although they filed their federal complaint, and later their appeal, without the aid of an attorney. The Winkelmans’ complaint sought reversal of the administrative decision, reimbursement for private-school expenditures and attorney’s fees already incurred, and, it appears, declaratory relief.
The District Court granted respondent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding it had provided Jacob with a free appropriate public education. Petitioners, proceeding without counsel, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Relying on its recent decision in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School Dist., 409 F. 3d 753 (2005), the Court of Appeals entered an order dismissing the Winkelmans’ appeal unless they obtained counsel to represent Jacob. See Order in No. 05–3886 (Nov. 4, 2005), App. A to Pet. for Cert. 1a. In Cavanaugh the Court of Appeals had rejected the proposition that IDEA allows nonlawyer parents raising IDEA claims to proceed pro se in federal court. The court ruled that the right to a free appropriate public education “belongs to the child alone,” 409 F. 3d, at 757, not to both the parents and the child. It followed, the court held, that “any right on which the [parents] could proceed on their own behalf would be derivative” of the child’s right, ibid., so that parents bringing IDEA claims were not appearing on their own behalf, ibid. See also 28 U. S. C. §1654 (allowing parties to prosecute their own claims pro se). As for the parents’ alternative argument, the court held, nonlawyer parents cannot litigate IDEA claims on behalf of their child because IDEA does not abrogate the common-law rule prohibiting nonlawyer parents from representing minor children.409 F. 3d, at 756. As the court in Cavanaugh acknowledged, its decision brought the Sixth Circuit in direct conflict with the First Circuit, which had concluded, under a theory of “statutory joint rights,” that the Act accords to parents the right to assert IDEA claims on their own behalf. See Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School Dist., 346 F. 3d 247, 249, 250 (CA1 2003).
Petitioners sought review in this Court. In light of the disagreement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether a nonlawyer parent of a child with a disability may prosecute IDEA actions pro se in federal court, we granted certiorari. 549 U. S. ___ (2006). Compare Cavanaugh, supra, with Maroni, supra; see also Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527 (CA7 2006); Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225 (CA3 1998); Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576 (CA11 1997).
II
Our resolution of this case turns upon the significance of IDEA’s interlocking statutory provisions. Petitioners’ primary theory is that the Act makes parents real parties in interest to IDEA actions, not “mer[e] guardians of their children’s rights.” Brief for Petitioners 16. If correct, this allows Mr. and Mrs. Winkelman back into court, for there is no question that a party may represent his or her own interests in federal court without the aid of counsel. See 28 U. S. C. §1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel . . .”). Petitioners cannot cite a specific provision in IDEA mandating in direct and explicit terms that parents have the status of real parties in interest. They instead base their argument on a comprehensive reading of IDEA. Taken as a whole, they contend, the Act leads to the necessary conclusion that parents have independent, enforceable rights. Brief for Petitioners 14 (citing Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U. S. 50, 60 (2004)). Respondent, accusing petitioners of “knit[ting] together various provisions pulled from the crevices of the statute” to support these claims, Brief for Respondent 19, reads the text of IDEA to mean that any redressable rights under the Act belong only to children, id., at 19–40.
We agree that the text of IDEA resolves the question presented. We recognize, in addition, that a proper interpretation of the Act requires a consideration of the entire statutory scheme. See Dolan v. Postal Service, 546 U. S. 481, 486 (2006). Turning to the current version of IDEA, which the parties agree governs this case, we begin with an overview of the relevant statutory provisions.
A
The goals of IDEA include “ensur[ing] that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education” and “ensur[ing] that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20 U. S. C. §§1400(d)(1)(A)–(B) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). To this end, the Act includes provisions governing four areas of particular relevance to the Winkelmans’ claim: procedures to be followed when developing a child’s IEP; criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a child; mechanisms for review that must be made available when there are objections to the IEP or to other aspects of IDEA proceedings; and the requirement in certain circumstances that States reimburse parents for various expenses. See generally §§1412(a)(10), 1414, 1415. Although our discussion of these four areas does not identify all the illustrative provisions, we do take particular note of certain terms that mandate or otherwise describe parental involvement.
IDEA requires school districts to develop an IEP for each child with a disability, see §§1412(a)(4), 1414(d), with parents playing “a significant role” in this process, Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U. S. 49, 53 (2005). Parents serve as members of the team that develops the IEP. §1414(d)(1)(B). The “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” must be considered by the team. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). IDEA accords parents additional protections that apply throughout the IEP process. See, e.g., §1414(d)(4)(A) (requiring the IEP Team to revise the IEP when appropriate to address certain information provided by the parents); §1414(e) (requiring States to “ensure that the parents of [a child with a disability] are members of any group that makes decisions on the educational placement of their child”). The statute also sets up general procedural safeguards that protect the informed involvement of parents in the development of an education for their child. See, e.g., §1415(a) (requiring States to “establish and maintain procedures … to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education”); §1415(b)(1) (mandating that States provide an opportunity for parents to examine all relevant records). See generally §§1414, 1415. A central purpose of the parental protections is to facilitate the provision of a “ ‘free appropriate public education,’ ” §1401(9), which must be made available to the child “in conformity with the [IEP],” §1401(9)(D).
The Act defines a “free appropriate public education” pursuant to an IEP to be an educational instruction “specially designed . . . to meet the unique needs of a child with a disability,” §1401(29), coupled with any additional
“ ‘related services’ ” that are “required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from [that instruction],” §1401(26)(A). See also §1401(9). The education must, among other things, be provided “under public supervision and direction,” “meet the standards of the State educational agency,” and “include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved.” Ibid. The instruction must, in addition, be provided at “no cost to parents.” §1401(29). See generally Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U. S. 176 (1982) (discussing the meaning of “free appropriate public education” as used in the statutory precursor to IDEA).
When a party objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related matter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: It requires that a State provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6). By presenting a complaint a party is able to pursue a process of review that, as relevant, begins with a preliminary meeting “where the parents of the child discuss their complaint” and the local educational agency “is provided the opportunity to [reach a resolution].” §1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV). If the agency “has not resolved the complaint to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days,” §1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), the parents may request an “impartial due process hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), which must be conducted either by the local educational agency or by the state educational agency, ibid., and where a hearing officer will resolve issues raised in the complaint, §1415(f)(3).
IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,” and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate public education” only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” §§1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).

If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” §1415(g)(1). Once the state educational agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A); see also §1415(i)(1).
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost recovery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circumstances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disability] for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Second, it sets forth rules governing when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees. See §1415(i)(3)(B). Included in this section is a provision allowing an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.
The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in a manner that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents will be the parties bringing the administrative complaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we refer also to §1415(b)(8) (requiring a state educational agency to “develop a model form to assist parents in filing a complaint”); §1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an agency must provide to a “parent’s due process complaint notice”); and §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “the parent’s complaint”). A wide range of review is available: Administrative complaints may be brought with respect to “any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(b)(6)(A). Claims raised in these complaints are then resolved at impartial due process hearings, where, again, the statute makes clear that parents will be participating as parties. See generally supra, at 7–8. See also §1415(f)(3)(C) (indicating “[a] parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing” within a certain period of time); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (referring to “a parent’s right to a due process hearing”). The statute then grants “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] . . . the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A).
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection the moment the administrative proceedings end. Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights accorded to them once the time comes to file a civil action. Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests. In respondent’s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than “collateral tools related to the child’s underlying substantive rights—not freestanding or independently enforceable rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). The word “rights” in the quoted language refers to the rights of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical structure would make no sense.
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(a). It presumes parents have rights of their own when it defines how States might provide for the transfer of the “rights accorded to parents” by IDEA, §1415(m)(1)(B), and it prohibits the raising of certain challenges “[n]otwithstanding any other individual right of action that a parent or student may maintain under [the relevant provisions of IDEA],” §§1401(10)(E), 1412(a)(14)(E). To adopt respondent’s reading of the statute would require an interpretation of these statutory provisions (and others) far too strained to be correct.
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, respondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding that the Act’s “references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child’s incapacity.” Doe v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4 1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’ rights as referring in implicit terms to the child’s rights — which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights accorded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we disagree that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–401 (1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law, then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without question a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” §1400(c)(1).
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Congress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights concerning the education of their children. We instead interpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent’s argument has persuaded some Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party aggrieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under this view the causes of action available to a parent might relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands, see, e.g., §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The argument supporting this conclusion proceeds as follows: Because a “party aggrieved” is, by definition, entitled to a remedy, and parents are, under IDEA, only entitled to certain procedures and reimbursements as remedies, a parent cannot be a “party aggrieved” with regard to any claim not implicating these limited matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions we have recited. True, there are provisions in IDEA stating parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find little support for the inference that parents are excluded by implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa. Compare, e.g., §1411(e)(3)(E) (barring States from using certain funds for costs associated with actions “brought on behalf of a child” but failing to acknowledge that actions might also be brought on behalf of a parent) with §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” but failing to acknowledge that a child might also be a prevailing party). Without more, then, the language in IDEA confirming that parents enjoy particular procedural and reimbursement-related rights does not resolve whether they are also entitled to enforce IDEA’s other mandates, including the one most fundamental to the Act: the provision of a free appropriate public education to a child with a disability.
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. Among other things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when it formulates the IEP. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). The IEP, in turn, sets the boundaries of the central entitlement provided by IDEA: It defines a “ ‘free appropriate public education’ ” for that parent’s child. §1401(9).
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6)(A). To resolve these challenges a hearing officer must make a decision based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E). When this hearing has been conducted by a local educational agency rather than a state educational agency, “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision” to the state educational agency. §1415(g)(1). Judicial review follows, authorized by a broadly worded provision phrased in the same terms used to describe the prior stage of review: “[a]ny party aggrieved” may bring “a civil action.” §1415(i)(2)(A).

These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party aggrieved” for purposes of §1415(i)(2) with regard to “any matter” implicating these rights. See §1415(b)(6)(A). The status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that relate to procedure and cost recovery. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and expansive system of review established by the Act. Cf. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U. S. 66, 73 (1999) (looking to IDEA’s “overall statutory scheme” to interpret its provisions).
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous results that would follow were we to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. The statute’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child, see, e.g., §1415(f)(3)(E), see also §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and it is difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not. Were we nevertheless to recognize a distinction of this sort it would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might in practice differentiate between these matters. It is, in addition, out of accord with the statute’s design to interpret the Act to require that parents prove the substantive inadequacy of their child’s education as a predicate for obtaining, for example, reimbursement under §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), yet to prevent them from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child with an educational program demonstrated to be an appropriate one. The adequacy of the educational program is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provisions of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we decline to infer them.
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a remedy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at public expense,” §1401(9)(A), including specially designed instruction “at no cost to parents,” §1401(29). Parents may seek to enforce this mandate through the federal courts, we conclude, because among the rights they enjoy is the right to a free appropriate public education for their child. Under the countervailing view, which would make a parent’s ability to enforce IDEA dependant on certain procedural and reimbursement-related rights, a parent whose disabled child has not received a free appropriate public education would have recourse in the federal courts only under two circumstances: when the parent happens to have some claim related to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to incur, and has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child’s education would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appropriate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent. What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to provide adequate instruction to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). See, e.g., §1415(e)(2) (requiring that States implement procedures to ensure parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that mediation procedures not be “used to deny or delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing . . . or to deny any other rights afforded under this subchapter”); cf. §1400(c)(3) (noting IDEA’s success in “ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children access to a free appropriate public education”).
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reasoning we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail without overcoming a further difficulty. Citing our opinion in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___ (2006), respondent argues that statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, such as IDEA, must provide “ ‘clear notice’ ” before they can burden a State with some new condition, obligation, or liability. Brief for Respondent 41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition to the States. See id., at 40–49.
Respondent’s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Arlington we addressed whether IDEA required States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. “[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) ). The question to be answered in Arlington, therefore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We found it did not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might have more force: A determination by the Court that some distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations. But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter, increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to defend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause. Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in certain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action . . . for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). This provision allows some relief when a party has proceeded in violation of these standards.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal traditions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the education of one’s child; and, what is more, Congress has found that “the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home.” §1400(c)(5).
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), when they seek reimbursement for private school expenses or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they seek a judicial determination that their child’s free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA and the general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The latter, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1654, provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (Emphasis added.) The IDEA’s right-to-sue provision, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of a hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the [administrative] complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when parents are “parties aggrieved” under the IDEA, they are “parties” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1654, entitled to sue on their own behalf.[1]
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 12. This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of filing their own cases in federal court.
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as relevant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of rights.[2] First, under certain circumstances “a court or a hearing officer may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents” for private school expenditures “if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school district] had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Second, parents are accorded a variety of procedural protections, both during the development of their child’s individualized education program (IEP), see, e.g., §1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (parents are members of their child’s IEP team); §1415(b)(1) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and participate in IEP meetings), and in any subsequent administrative challenges, see, e.g., §§1415(b)(6), (8) (parents may file administrative due process complaints). It is clear that parents may object to procedural violations at the administrative due process hearing, see §1415(b)(6)(A), and that a hearing officer may provide relief to parents for certain procedural infractions, see §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Because the rights to reimbursement and to the various procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are “parties aggrieved” when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to vindicate them.[3]
The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge the substantive adequacy of their child’s FAPE — so that parents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See ante, at 11–16. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs, participating States must provide a “free appropriate public education … to all children with disabilities … .” §1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The statute is replete with references to the fact that a FAPE belongs to the child. See, e.g., §1400(d)(1)(A) (IDEA designed “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education”); §1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to “the right of a child” to “receive a free appropriate public education”); §1411(e)(3)(F)(i) (same); §1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) (referring to an agency “that is responsible for making a free appropriate public education available to a child”); §1415(b)(6)(A) (referring to “the provision of a free appropriate public education to [a] child”). The parents of a disabled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents have no right to the education itself.[4]
The Court concedes, as it must, that while the IDEA gives parents the right to reimbursement and procedural protection in explicit terms, it does not do so for the supposed right to the education itself. Ante, at 12. The obvious inference to be drawn from the statute’s clear and explicit conferral of discrete types of rights upon parents and children, respectively, is that it does not by accident confer the parent-designated rights upon children, or the children-designated rights upon parents. The Court believes, however, that “the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on [this] implicatio[n].” Ibid. That conclusion is in error. Nothing in “the statute,” undermines the obvious “implication” of Congress’s scheme. What the Court relies upon for its conclusion that parents have a substantive right to a FAPE is not the “statutory structure,” ante, at 13, but rather the myriad procedural guarantees accorded to parents in the administrative process, see ibid. But allowing parents, by means of these guarantees, to help shape the contours of their child’s education is simply not the same as giving them the right to that education. Nor can the Court sensibly rely on the provisions governing due process hearings and administrative appeals, the various provisions that refer to the “parent’s complaint,” see, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), or the fact that the right-to-sue provision, §1415(i)(2)(A), refers to the administrative complaint, which in turn allows parents to challenge “any matter” relating to the provision of a FAPE, §1415(b)(6)(A). These provisions prove nothing except what all parties concede: that parents may represent their child pro se at the administrative level. See Brief for Petitioners 17–18, 40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief for Respondent 13, 44; see also Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Parents thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights they are.[5] The Court’s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA’s “text and structure” (by which it means the statute’s procedural protections), the Court announces the startling proposition that, in fact, the “IDEA does not differentiate … between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents.” Ante, at 13. If that were so, the Court could have spared us its painful effort to craft a distinctive parental right out of scattered procedural provisions. But of course it is not so. The IDEA quite clearly differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Congress specifically indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are separate from and independent of their children’s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court … may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment”? §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added); see also Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (“The right of reimbursement runs to the parents”). Does the Court believe that a child has a procedural right under §§1414(d)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which gives parents the power to excuse an IEP team member from attending an IEP meeting? The IDEA does not remotely envision communal “family” rights.
The Court believes that because parents must prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reimbursement, §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), and because the suitability of a FAPE may also be at issue when procedural violations are alleged, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), it is “out of accord with the statute’s design” to “prevent [parents] from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child” with a FAPE. Ante, at 14. That is a total non sequitur. That Congress has required parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of their child’s FAPE in order to vindicate their own rights says nothing about whether parents possess an underlying right to education. The Court insists that the right to a FAPE is the right “most fundamental to the Act.” Ante, at 12. Undoubtedly so, but that sheds no light upon whom the right belongs to, and hence upon who can sue in their own right. Congress has used the phrase “party aggrieved,” and it is this Court’s job to apply that language, not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between parental and child rights will prove difficult to administer. I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims, but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006); Collingsru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581, n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggesting that this majority rule has caused any confusion in practice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’ and children’s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injustice,” ante, at 15, since parents who do not seek reimbursement or allege procedural violations would be “without a remedy,” ante, at 14–15. That, of course, is not true. They will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindicate their children’s rights: the power to bring suit, represented by counsel. But even indulging the Court’s perception that it is unfair to allow some but not all IDEA parents to proceed pro se, that complaint is properly addressed to Congress, which structured the rights as it has, and limited suit to “party aggrieved.” And there are good reasons for it to have done so. Pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts — and on defendants, in this case the schools and school districts that must hire their own lawyers. Since pro se complaints are prosecuted essentially for free, without screening by knowledgeable attorneys, they are much more likely to be unmeritorious. And for courts to figure them out without the assistance of plaintiff’s counsel is much more difficult and time-consuming. In both categories of pro se parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Actions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous, since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money for private education without some solid reason to believe the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive record-review that characterizes suits challenging the suitability of a FAPE.
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural violations, and requested a declaration that their child’s FAPE was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 3. I agree with the Court that they may proceed pro se with respect to the first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with respect to the third.
Notes
[1] As the Court notes, ante, at 2, 18, petitioners also argue that even if parents do not have their own rights under the statute, they nonetheless may act on behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay parents from representing their children in court, a manifestation of the more general common-law rule that nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of another. See Brief for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also, e.g., Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.
[2] Because the grant of those rights is clear, and because I find no statutory basis for any other rights, I need not decide whether the Spending Clause’s “clear notice” requirement is applicable here. Cf. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 4).
[3] Of course when parents assert procedural violations, they must also allege that those violations adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Under Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a procedural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of the proceeding to which the violation pertains, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 571–578 (1992), here the parents’ interest in having their child receive an appropriate education.
[4] Nor can a parental right to education be justified, as the Court attempts, see ante, at 14–15, on the theory that the IDEA gives parents a legal right to free schooling for their child. Parents acquire such a right (in limited circumstances) only when they enroll their child in a private institution. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
[5] Contrary to indications in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 13, and to the apparent language of the statute, a hearing officer does not always render a decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). That provision is “[s]ubject to clause (ii),” ibid., which provides that “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation” a hearing officer can grant relief if “the procedural inadequacies … significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child,” §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). It is true that a hearing officer who accepts such an allegation nominally grants relief by concluding that the child did not receive a FAPE, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), but it is clear from the structure of the statute that this is not a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, but rather the label attached to a finding of procedural defect. Petitioners agree with me on this point. See Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 23. See also 20 U. S. C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this section”). In any event, even if a hearing officer was required to render a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, that feature of the statute still gives no clue as to whether parents’ vindication of that substantive right at the administrative stage is on their own behalf or on behalf of the child.
End of Decision

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When a party objects to the adequacy of the education provided, the construction of the IEP, or some related matter, IDEA provides procedural recourse: It requires that a State provide “[a]n opportunity for any party to present a complaint . . . with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6). By presenting a complaint a party is able to pursue a process of review that, as relevant, begins with a preliminary meeting “where the parents of the child discuss their complaint” and the local educational agency “is provided the opportunity to [reach a resolution].” §1415(f)(1)(B)(i)(IV). If the agency “has not resolved the complaint to the satisfaction of the parents within 30 days,” §1415(f)(1)(B)(ii), the parents may request an “impartial due process hearing,” §1415(f)(1)(A), which must be conducted either by the local educational agency or by the state educational agency, ibid., and where a hearing officer will resolve issues raised in the complaint, §1415(f)(3).
IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,” and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate public education” only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decision making process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” §§1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).

If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” §1415(g)(1). Once the state educational agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A); see also §1415(i)(1




IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,” and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate public education” only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” §§1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).

If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” §1415(g)(1). Once the state educational agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A); see also §1415(i)(1).
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost recovery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circumstances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disability] for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Second, it sets forth rules governing when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees. See §1415(i)(3)(B). Included in this section is a provision allowing an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.
The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in a manner that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents will be the parties bringing the administrative complaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we refer also to §1415(b)(8) (requiring a state educational agency to “develop a model form to assist parents in filing a complaint”); §1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an agency must provide to a “parent’s due process complaint notice”); and §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “the parent’s complaint”). A wide range of review is available: Administrative complaints may be brought with respect to “any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(b)(6)(A). Claims raised in these complaints are then resolved at impartial due process hearings, where, again, the statute makes clear that parents will be participating as parties. See generally supra, at 7–8. See also §1415(f)(3)(C) (indicating “[a] parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing” within a certain period of time); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (referring to “a parent’s right to a due process hearing”). The statute then grants “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] . . . the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A).
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection the moment the administrative proceedings end. Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights accorded to them once the time comes to file a civil action. Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests. In respondent’s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than “collateral tools related to the child’s underlying substantive rights—not freestanding or independently enforceable rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). The word “rights” in the quoted language refers to the rights of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical structure would make no sense.
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(a). It presumes parents have rights of their own when it defines how States might provide for the transfer of the “rights accorded to parents” by IDEA, §1415(m)(1)(B), and it prohibits the raising of certain challenges “[n]otwithstanding any other individual right of action that a parent or student may maintain under [the relevant provisions of IDEA],” §§1401(10)(E), 1412(a)(14)(E). To adopt respondent’s reading of the statute would require an interpretation of these statutory provisions (and others) far too strained to be correct.
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, respondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding that the Act’s “references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child’s incapacity.” Doe v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4 1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’ rights as referring in implicit terms to the child’s rights — which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights accorded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we disagree that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–401 (1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law, then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without question a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” §1400(c)(1).
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Congress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights concerning the education of their children. We instead interpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent’s argument has persuaded some Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party aggrieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under this view the causes of action available to a parent might relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands, see, e.g., §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The argument supporting this conclusion proceeds as follows: Because a “party aggrieved” is, by definition, entitled to a remedy, and parents are, under IDEA, only entitled to certain procedures and reimbursements as remedies, a parent cannot be a “party aggrieved” with regard to any claim not implicating these limited matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions we have recited. True, there are provisions in IDEA stating parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find little support for the inference that parents are excluded by implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa. Compare, e.g., §1411(e)(3)(E) (barring States from using certain funds for costs associated with actions “brought on behalf of a child” but failing to acknowledge that actions might also be brought on behalf of a parent) with §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” but failing to acknowledge that a child might also be a prevailing party). Without more, then, the language in IDEA confirming that parents enjoy particular procedural and reimbursement-related rights does not resolve whether they are also entitled to enforce IDEA’s other mandates, including the one most fundamental to the Act: the provision of a free appropriate public education to a child with a disability.
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. Among other things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when it formulates the IEP. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). The IEP, in turn, sets the boundaries of the central entitlement provided by IDEA: It defines a “ ‘free appropriate public education’ ” for that parent’s child. §1401(9).
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6)(A). To resolve these challenges a hearing officer must make a decision based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E). When this hearing has been conducted by a local educational agency rather than a state educational agency, “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision” to the state educational agency. §1415(g)(1). Judicial review follows, authorized by a broadly worded provision phrased in the same terms used to describe the prior stage of review: “[a]ny party aggrieved” may bring “a civil action.” §1415(i)(2)(A).

These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party aggrieved” for purposes of §1415(i)(2) with regard to “any matter” implicating these rights. See §1415(b)(6)(A). The status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that relate to procedure and cost recovery. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and expansive system of review established by the Act. Cf. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U. S. 66, 73 (1999) (looking to IDEA’s “overall statutory scheme” to interpret its provisions).
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous results that would follow were we to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. The statute’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child, see, e.g., §1415(f)(3)(E), see also §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and it is difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not. Were we nevertheless to recognize a distinction of this sort it would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might in practice differentiate between these matters. It is, in addition, out of accord with the statute’s design to interpret the Act to require that parents prove the substantive inadequacy of their child’s education as a predicate for obtaining, for example, reimbursement under §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), yet to prevent them from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child with an educational program demonstrated to be an appropriate one. The adequacy of the educational program is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provisions of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we decline to infer them.
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a remedy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at public expense,” §1401(9)(A), including specially designed instruction “at no cost to parents,” §1401(29). Parents may seek to enforce this mandate through the federal courts, we conclude, because among the rights they enjoy is the right to a free appropriate public education for their child. Under the countervailing view, which would make a parent’s ability to enforce IDEA dependant on certain procedural and reimbursement-related rights, a parent whose disabled child has not received a free appropriate public education would have recourse in the federal courts only under two circumstances: when the parent happens to have some claim related to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to incur, and has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child’s education would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appropriate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent. What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to provide adequate instruction to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). See, e.g., §1415(e)(2) (requiring that States implement procedures to ensure parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that mediation procedures not be “used to deny or delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing . . . or to deny any other rights afforded under this subchapter”); cf. §1400(c)(3) (noting IDEA’s success in “ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children access to a free appropriate public education”).
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reasoning we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail without overcoming a further difficulty. Citing our opinion in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___ (2006), respondent argues that statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, such as IDEA, must provide “ ‘clear notice’ ” before they can burden a State with some new condition, obligation, or liability. Brief for Respondent 41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition to the States. See id., at 40–49.
Respondent’s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Arlington we addressed whether IDEA required States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. “[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) ). The question to be answered in Arlington, therefore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We found it did not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might have more force: A determination by the Court that some distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations. But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter, increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to defend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause. Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in certain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action . . . for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). This provision allows some relief when a party has proceeded in violation of these standards.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal traditions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the education of one’s child; and, what is more, Congress has found that “the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home.” §1400(c)(5).
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), when they seek reimbursement for private school expenses or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they seek a judicial determination that their child’s free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA and the general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The latter, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1654, provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (Emphasis added.) The IDEA’s right-to-sue provision, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of a hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the [administrative] complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when parents are “parties aggrieved” under the IDEA, they are “parties” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1654, entitled to sue on their own behalf.[1]
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 12. This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of filing their own cases in federal court.
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as relevant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of rights.[2] First, under certain circumstances “a court or a hearing officer may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents” for private school expenditures “if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school district] had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Second, parents are accorded a variety of procedural protections, both during the development of their child’s individualized education program (IEP), see, e.g., §1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (parents are members of their child’s IEP team); §1415(b)(1) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and participate in IEP meetings), and in any subsequent administrative challenges, see, e.g., §§1415(b)(6), (8) (parents may file administrative due process complaints). It is clear that parents may object to procedural violations at the administrative due process hearing, see §1415(b)(6)(A), and that a hearing officer may provide relief to parents for certain procedural infractions, see §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Because the rights to reimbursement and to the various procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are “parties aggrieved” when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to vindicate them.[3]
The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge the substantive adequacy of their child’s FAPE — so that parents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See ante, at 11–16. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs, participating States must provide a “free appropriate public education … to all children with disabilities … .” §1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The statute is replete with references to the fact that a FAPE belongs to the child. See, e.g., §1400(d)(1)(A) (IDEA designed “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education”); §1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to “the right of a child” to “receive a free appropriate public education”); §1411(e)(3)(F)(i) (same); §1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) (referring to an agency “that is responsible for making a free appropriate public education available to a child”); §1415(b)(6)(A) (referring to “the provision of a free appropriate public education to [a] child”). The parents of a disabled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents have no right to the education itself.[4]
The Court concedes, as it must, that while the IDEA gives parents the right to reimbursement and procedural protection in explicit terms, it does not do so for the supposed right to the education itself. Ante, at 12. The obvious inference to be drawn from the statute’s clear and explicit conferral of discrete types of rights upon parents and children, respectively, is that it does not by accident confer the parent-designated rights upon children, or the children-designated rights upon parents. The Court believes, however, that “the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on [this] implicatio[n].” Ibid. That conclusion is in error. Nothing in “the statute,” undermines the obvious “implication” of Congress’s scheme. What the Court relies upon for its conclusion that parents have a substantive right to a FAPE is not the “statutory structure,” ante, at 13, but rather the myriad procedural guarantees accorded to parents in the administrative process, see ibid. But allowing parents, by means of these guarantees, to help shape the contours of their child’s education is simply not the same as giving them the right to that education. Nor can the Court sensibly rely on the provisions governing due process hearings and administrative appeals, the various provisions that refer to the “parent’s complaint,” see, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), or the fact that the right-to-sue provision, §1415(i)(2)(A), refers to the administrative complaint, which in turn allows parents to challenge “any matter” relating to the provision of a FAPE, §1415(b)(6)(A). These provisions prove nothing except what all parties concede: that parents may represent their child pro se at the administrative level. See Brief for Petitioners 17–18, 40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief for Respondent 13, 44; see also Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Parents thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights they are.[5] The Court’s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA’s “text and structure” (by which it means the statute’s procedural protections), the Court announces the startling proposition that, in fact, the “IDEA does not differentiate … between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents.” Ante, at 13. If that were so, the Court could have spared us its painful effort to craft a distinctive parental right out of scattered procedural provisions. But of course it is not so. The IDEA quite clearly differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Congress specifically indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are separate from and independent of their children’s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court … may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment”? §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added); see also Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (“The right of reimbursement runs to the parents”). Does the Court believe that a child has a procedural right under §§1414(d)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which gives parents the power to excuse an IEP team member from attending an IEP meeting? The IDEA does not remotely envision communal “family” rights.
The Court believes that because parents must prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reimbursement, §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), and because the suitability of a FAPE may also be at issue when procedural violations are alleged, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), it is “out of accord with the statute’s design” to “prevent [parents] from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child” with a FAPE. Ante, at 14. That is a total non sequitur. That Congress has required parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of their child’s FAPE in order to vindicate their own rights says nothing about whether parents possess an underlying right to education. The Court insists that the right to a FAPE is the right “most fundamental to the Act.” Ante, at 12. Undoubtedly so, but that sheds no light upon whom the right belongs to, and hence upon who can sue in their own right. Congress has used the phrase “party aggrieved,” and it is this Court’s job to apply that language, not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between parental and child rights will prove difficult to administer. I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims, but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006); Collingsru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581, n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggesting that this majority rule has caused any confusion in practice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’ and children’s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injustice,” ante, at 15, since parents who do not seek reimbursement or allege procedural violations would be “without a remedy,” ante, at 14–15. That, of course, is not true. They will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindicate their children’s rights: the power to bring suit, represented by counsel. But even indulging the Court’s perception that it is unfair to allow some but not all IDEA parents to proceed pro se, that complaint is properly addressed to Congress, which structured the rights as it has, and limited suit to “party aggrieved.” And there are good reasons for it to have done so. Pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts — and on defendants, in this case the schools and school districts that must hire their own lawyers. Since pro se complaints are prosecuted essentially for free, without screening by knowledgeable attorneys, they are much more likely to be unmeritorious. And for courts to figure them out without the assistance of plaintiff’s counsel is much more difficult and time-consuming. In both categories of pro se parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Actions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous, since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money for private education without some solid reason to believe the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive record-review that characterizes suits challenging the suitability of a FAPE.
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural violations, and requested a declaration that their child’s FAPE was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 3. I agree with the Court that they may proceed pro se with respect to the first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with respect to the third.
Notes
[1] As the Court notes, ante, at 2, 18, petitioners also argue that even if parents do not have their own rights under the statute, they nonetheless may act on behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay parents from representing their children in court, a manifestation of the more general common-law rule that nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of another. See Brief for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also, e.g., Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.
[2] Because the grant of those rights is clear, and because I find no statutory basis for any other rights, I need not decide whether the Spending Clause’s “clear notice” requirement is applicable here. Cf. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 4).
[3] Of course when parents assert procedural violations, they must also allege that those violations adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Under Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a procedural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of the proceeding to which the violation pertains, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 571–578 (1992), here the parents’ interest in having their child receive an appropriate education.
[4] Nor can a parental right to education be justified, as the Court attempts, see ante, at 14–15, on the theory that the IDEA gives parents a legal right to free schooling for their child. Parents acquire such a right (in limited circumstances) only when they enroll their child in a private institution. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
[5] Contrary to indications in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 13, and to the apparent language of the statute, a hearing officer does not always render a decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). That provision is “[s]ubject to clause (ii),” ibid., which provides that “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation” a hearing officer can grant relief if “the procedural inadequacies … significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child,” §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). It is true that a hearing officer who accepts such an allegation nominally grants relief by concluding that the child did not receive a FAPE, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), but it is clear from the structure of the statute that this is not a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, but rather the label attached to a finding of procedural defect. Petitioners agree with me on this point. See Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 23. See also 20 U. S. C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this section”). In any event, even if a hearing officer was required to render a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, that feature of the statute still gives no clue as to whether parents’ vindication of that substantive right at the administrative stage is on their own behalf or on behalf of the child.
End of Decision

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IDEA sets standards the States must follow in conducting these hearings. Among other things, it indicates that the hearing officer’s decision “shall be made on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education,” and that, “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation,” the officer may find a child “did not receive a free appropriate public education” only if the violation
“(I) impeded the child’s right to a free appropriate public education;
“(II) significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child; or
“(III) caused a deprivation of educational benefits.” §§1415(f)(3)(E)(i)–(ii).

If the local educational agency, rather than the state educational agency, conducts this hearing, then “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision to the State educational agency.” §1415(g)(1). Once the state educational agency has reached its decision, an aggrieved party may commence suit in federal court: “Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A); see also §1415(i)(1).
IDEA, finally, provides for at least two means of cost recovery that inform our analysis. First, in certain circumstances it allows a court or hearing officer to require a state agency “to reimburse the parents [of a child with a disability] for the cost of [private school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). Second, it sets forth rules governing when and to what extent a court may award attorney’s fees. See §1415(i)(3)(B). Included in this section is a provision allowing an award “to a prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I).
B
Petitioners construe these various provisions to accord parents independent, enforceable rights under IDEA. We agree. The parents enjoy enforceable rights at the administrative stage, and it would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme to bar them from continuing to assert these rights in federal court.
The statute sets forth procedures for resolving disputes in a manner that, in the Act’s express terms, contemplates parents will be the parties bringing the administrative complaints. In addition to the provisions we have cited, we refer also to §1415(b)(8) (requiring a state educational agency to “develop a model form to assist parents in filing a complaint”); §1415(c)(2) (addressing the response an agency must provide to a “parent’s due process complaint notice”); and §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (referring to “the parent’s complaint”). A wide range of review is available: Administrative complaints may be brought with respect to “any matter relating to . . . the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(b)(6)(A). Claims raised in these complaints are then resolved at impartial due process hearings, where, again, the statute makes clear that parents will be participating as parties. See generally supra, at 7–8. See also §1415(f)(3)(C) (indicating “[a] parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing” within a certain period of time); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (referring to “a parent’s right to a due process hearing”). The statute then grants “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision made [by the hearing officer] . . . the right to bring a civil action with respect to the complaint.” §1415(i)(2)(A).
Nothing in these interlocking provisions excludes a parent who has exercised his or her own rights from statutory protection the moment the administrative proceedings end. Put another way, the Act does not sub silentio or by implication bar parents from seeking to vindicate the rights accorded to them once the time comes to file a civil action. Through its provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement, the statute leads to just the opposite result.
Respondent, resisting this line of analysis, asks us to read these provisions as contemplating parental involvement only to the extent parents represent their child’s interests. In respondent’s view IDEA accords parents nothing more than “collateral tools related to the child’s underlying substantive rights—not freestanding or independently enforceable rights.” Brief for Respondent 25.
This interpretation, though, is foreclosed by provisions of the statute. IDEA defines one of its purposes as seeking “to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). The word “rights” in the quoted language refers to the rights of parents as well as the rights of the child; otherwise the grammatical structure would make no sense.
Further provisions confirm this view. IDEA mandates that educational agencies establish procedures “to ensure that children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education.” §1415(a). It presumes parents have rights of their own when it defines how States might provide for the transfer of the “rights accorded to parents” by IDEA, §1415(m)(1)(B), and it prohibits the raising of certain challenges “[n]otwithstanding any other individual right of action that a parent or student may maintain under [the relevant provisions of IDEA],” §§1401(10)(E), 1412(a)(14)(E). To adopt respondent’s reading of the statute would require an interpretation of these statutory provisions (and others) far too strained to be correct.
Defending its countertextual reading of the statute, respondent cites a decision by a Court of Appeals concluding that the Act’s “references to parents are best understood as accommodations to the fact of the child’s incapacity.” Doe v. Board of Ed. of Baltimore Cty., 165 F. 3d 260, 263 (CA4 1998); see also Brief for Respondent 30. This, according to respondent, requires us to interpret all references to parents’ rights as referring in implicit terms to the child’s rights — which, under this view, are the only enforceable rights accorded by IDEA. Even if we were inclined to ignore the plain text of the statute in considering this theory, we disagree that the sole purpose driving IDEA’s involvement of parents is to facilitate vindication of a child’s rights. It is not a novel proposition to say that parents have a recognized legal interest in the education and upbringing of their child. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534–535 (1925) (acknowledging “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399–401 (1923). There is no necessary bar or obstacle in the law, then, to finding an intention by Congress to grant parents a stake in the entitlements created by IDEA. Without question a parent of a child with a disability has a particular and personal interest in fulfilling “our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals with disabilities.” §1400(c)(1).
We therefore find no reason to read into the plain language of the statute an implicit rejection of the notion that Congress would accord parents independent, enforceable rights concerning the education of their children. We instead interpret the statute’s references to parents’ rights to mean what they say: that IDEA includes provisions conveying rights to parents as well as to children.
A variation on respondent’s argument has persuaded some Courts of Appeals. The argument is that while a parent can be a “party aggrieved” for aspects of the hearing officer’s findings and decision, he or she cannot be a “party aggrieved” with respect to all IDEA-based challenges. Under this view the causes of action available to a parent might relate, for example, to various procedural mandates, see, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F. 3d, at 233, and reimbursement demands, see, e.g., §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). The argument supporting this conclusion proceeds as follows: Because a “party aggrieved” is, by definition, entitled to a remedy, and parents are, under IDEA, only entitled to certain procedures and reimbursements as remedies, a parent cannot be a “party aggrieved” with regard to any claim not implicating these limited matters.
This argument is contradicted by the statutory provisions we have recited. True, there are provisions in IDEA stating parents are entitled to certain procedural protections and reimbursements; but the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on the implications to be drawn when other entitlements are accorded in less clear language. We find little support for the inference that parents are excluded by implication whenever a child is mentioned, and vice versa. Compare, e.g., §1411(e)(3)(E) (barring States from using certain funds for costs associated with actions “brought on behalf of a child” but failing to acknowledge that actions might also be brought on behalf of a parent) with §1415(i)(3)(B)(i) (allowing recovery of attorney’s fees to a “prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability” but failing to acknowledge that a child might also be a prevailing party). Without more, then, the language in IDEA confirming that parents enjoy particular procedural and reimbursement-related rights does not resolve whether they are also entitled to enforce IDEA’s other mandates, including the one most fundamental to the Act: the provision of a free appropriate public education to a child with a disability.
We consider the statutory structure. The IEP proceedings entitle parents to participate not only in the implementation of IDEA’s procedures but also in the substantive formulation of their child’s educational program. Among other things, IDEA requires the IEP Team, which includes the parents as members, to take into account any “concerns” parents have “for enhancing the education of their child” when it formulates the IEP. §1414(d)(3)(A)(ii). The IEP, in turn, sets the boundaries of the central entitlement provided by IDEA: It defines a “ ‘free appropriate public education’ ” for that parent’s child. §1401(9).
The statute also empowers parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. The parent may seek a hearing on “any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child.” §1415(b)(6)(A). To resolve these challenges a hearing officer must make a decision based on whether the child “received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E). When this hearing has been conducted by a local educational agency rather than a state educational agency, “any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such a hearing may appeal such findings and decision” to the state educational agency. §1415(g)(1). Judicial review follows, authorized by a broadly worded provision phrased in the same terms used to describe the prior stage of review: “[a]ny party aggrieved” may bring “a civil action.” §1415(i)(2)(A).

These provisions confirm that IDEA, through its text and structure, creates in parents an independent stake not only in the procedures and costs implicated by this process but also in the substantive decisions to be made. We therefore conclude that IDEA does not differentiate, through isolated references to various procedures and remedies, between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents. As a consequence, a parent may be a “party aggrieved” for purposes of §1415(i)(2) with regard to “any matter” implicating these rights. See §1415(b)(6)(A). The status of parents as parties is not limited to matters that relate to procedure and cost recovery. To find otherwise would be inconsistent with the collaborative framework and expansive system of review established by the Act. Cf. Cedar Rapids Community School Dist. v. Garret F., 526 U. S. 66, 73 (1999) (looking to IDEA’s “overall statutory scheme” to interpret its provisions).
Our conclusion is confirmed by noting the incongruous results that would follow were we to accept the proposition that parents’ IDEA rights are limited to certain nonsubstantive matters. The statute’s procedural and reimbursement-related rights are intertwined with the substantive adequacy of the education provided to a child, see, e.g., §1415(f)(3)(E), see also §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), and it is difficult to disentangle the provisions in order to conclude that some rights adhere to both parent and child while others do not. Were we nevertheless to recognize a distinction of this sort it would impose upon parties a confusing and onerous legal regime, one worsened by the absence of any express guidance in IDEA concerning how a court might in practice differentiate between these matters. It is, in addition, out of accord with the statute’s design to interpret the Act to require that parents prove the substantive inadequacy of their child’s education as a predicate for obtaining, for example, reimbursement under §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii), yet to prevent them from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child with an educational program demonstrated to be an appropriate one. The adequacy of the educational program is, after all, the central issue in the litigation. The provisions of IDEA do not set forth these distinctions, and we decline to infer them.
The bifurcated regime suggested by the courts that have employed it, moreover, leaves some parents without a remedy. The statute requires, in express terms, that States provide a child with a free appropriate public education “at public expense,” §1401(9)(A), including specially designed instruction “at no cost to parents,” §1401(29). Parents may seek to enforce this mandate through the federal courts, we conclude, because among the rights they enjoy is the right to a free appropriate public education for their child. Under the countervailing view, which would make a parent’s ability to enforce IDEA dependant on certain procedural and reimbursement-related rights, a parent whose disabled child has not received a free appropriate public education would have recourse in the federal courts only under two circumstances: when the parent happens to have some claim related to the procedures employed; and when he or she is able to incur, and has in fact incurred, expenses creating a right to reimbursement. Otherwise the adequacy of the child’s education would not be regarded as relevant to any cause of action the parent might bring; and, as a result, only the child could vindicate the right accorded by IDEA to a free appropriate public education.
The potential for injustice in this result is apparent. What is more, we find nothing in the statute to indicate that when Congress required States to provide adequate instruction to a child “at no cost to parents,” it intended that only some parents would be able to enforce that mandate. The statute instead takes pains to “ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” §1400(d)(1)(B). See, e.g., §1415(e)(2) (requiring that States implement procedures to ensure parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to the provision of a free appropriate public education); §1415(e)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring that mediation procedures not be “used to deny or delay a parent’s right to a due process hearing . . . or to deny any other rights afforded under this subchapter”); cf. §1400(c)(3) (noting IDEA’s success in “ensuring children with disabilities and the families of such children access to a free appropriate public education”).
We conclude IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights. These rights, which are not limited to certain procedural and reimbursement-related matters, encompass the entitlement to a free appropriate public education for the parents’ child.
C
Respondent contends, though, that even under the reasoning we have now explained petitioners cannot prevail without overcoming a further difficulty. Citing our opinion in Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___ (2006), respondent argues that statutes passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, such as IDEA, must provide “ ‘clear notice’ ” before they can burden a State with some new condition, obligation, or liability. Brief for Respondent 41. Respondent contends that because IDEA is, at best, ambiguous as to whether it accords parents independent rights, it has failed to provide clear notice of this condition to the States. See id., at 40–49.
Respondent’s reliance on Arlington is misplaced. In Arlington we addressed whether IDEA required States to reimburse experts’ fees to prevailing parties in IDEA actions. “[W]hen Congress attaches conditions to a State’s acceptance of federal funds,” we explained, “the conditions must be set out ‘unambiguously.’ ” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (quoting Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981) ). The question to be answered in Arlington, therefore, was whether IDEA “furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue.” 548 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 4). We found it did not.
The instant case presents a different issue, one that does not invoke the same rule. Our determination that IDEA grants to parents independent, enforceable rights does not impose any substantive condition or obligation on States they would not otherwise be required by law to observe. The basic measure of monetary recovery, moreover, is not expanded by recognizing that some rights repose in both the parent and the child. Were we considering a statute other than the one before us, the Spending Clause argument might have more force: A determination by the Court that some distinct class of people has independent, enforceable rights might result in a change to the States’ statutory obligations. But that is not the case here.
Respondent argues our ruling will, as a practical matter, increase costs borne by the States as they are forced to defend against suits unconstrained by attorneys trained in the law and the rules of ethics. Effects such as these do not suffice to invoke the concerns under the Spending Clause. Furthermore, IDEA does afford relief for the States in certain cases. The Act empowers courts to award attorney’s fees to a prevailing educational agency whenever a parent has presented a “complaint or subsequent cause of action . . . for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation.” §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III). This provision allows some relief when a party has proceeded in violation of these standards.
III
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed the Winkelmans’ appeal for lack of counsel. Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf. The decision by Congress to grant parents these rights was consistent with the purpose of IDEA and fully in accord with our social and legal traditions. It is beyond dispute that the relationship between a parent and child is sufficient to support a legally cognizable interest in the education of one’s child; and, what is more, Congress has found that “the education of children with disabilities can be made more effective by . . . strengthening the role and responsibility of parents and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the education of their children at school and at home.” §1400(c)(5).
In light of our holding we need not reach petitioners’ alternative argument, which concerns whether IDEA entitles parents to litigate their child’s claims pro se.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part.
I would hold that parents have the right to proceed pro se under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §1400 et seq. (2000 ed. and Supp. IV), when they seek reimbursement for private school expenses or redress for violations of their own procedural rights, but not when they seek a judicial determination that their child’s free appropriate public education (or FAPE) is substantively inadequate.
Whether parents may bring suits under the IDEA without a lawyer depends upon the interaction between the IDEA and the general pro se provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789. The latter, codified at 28 U. S. C. §1654, provides that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel.” (Emphasis added.) The IDEA’s right-to-sue provision, 20 U.S.C. §1415(i)(2)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), provides that “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision [of a hearing officer] shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to the [administrative] complaint.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, when parents are “parties aggrieved” under the IDEA, they are “parties” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §1654, entitled to sue on their own behalf.[1]
As both parties agree, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 7; Brief for Respondent 37, “party aggrieved” means “[a] party entitled to a remedy; esp., a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1154 (8th ed. 2004); see also ante, at 12. This case thus turns on the rights that the IDEA accords to parents, and the concomitant remedies made available to them. Only with respect to such rights and remedies are parents properly viewed as “parties aggrieved,” capable of filing their own cases in federal court.
A review of the statutory text makes clear that, as relevant here, the IDEA grants parents only two types of rights.[2] First, under certain circumstances “a court or a hearing officer may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents” for private school expenditures “if the court or hearing officer finds that the [school district] had not made a free appropriate public education available to the child.” 20 U.S.C. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added). Second, parents are accorded a variety of procedural protections, both during the development of their child’s individualized education program (IEP), see, e.g., §1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (parents are members of their child’s IEP team); §1415(b)(1) (parents must have an opportunity to examine records and participate in IEP meetings), and in any subsequent administrative challenges, see, e.g., §§1415(b)(6), (8) (parents may file administrative due process complaints). It is clear that parents may object to procedural violations at the administrative due process hearing, see §1415(b)(6)(A), and that a hearing officer may provide relief to parents for certain procedural infractions, see §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii). Because the rights to reimbursement and to the various procedural protections are accorded to parents themselves, they are “parties aggrieved” when those rights are infringed, and may accordingly proceed pro se when seeking to vindicate them.[3]
The Court goes further, however, concluding that parents may proceed pro se not only when they seek reimbursement or assert procedural violations, but also when they challenge the substantive adequacy of their child’s FAPE — so that parents may act without a lawyer in every IDEA case. See ante, at 11–16. In my view, this sweeps far more broadly than the text allows. Out of this sprawling statute the Court cannot identify even a single provision stating that parents have the substantive right to a FAPE. The reason for this is readily understandable: The right to a free appropriate public education obviously inheres in the child, for it is he who receives the education. As the IDEA instructs, participating States must provide a “free appropriate public education … to all children with disabilities … .” §1412(a)(1)(A) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). The statute is replete with references to the fact that a FAPE belongs to the child. See, e.g., §1400(d)(1)(A) (IDEA designed “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education”); §1408(a)(2)(C)(i) (referring to “the right of a child” to “receive a free appropriate public education”); §1411(e)(3)(F)(i) (same); §1414(a)(1)(D)(i)(II) (referring to an agency “that is responsible for making a free appropriate public education available to a child”); §1415(b)(6)(A) (referring to “the provision of a free appropriate public education to [a] child”). The parents of a disabled child no doubt have an interest in seeing their child receive a proper education. But there is a difference between an interest and a statutory right. The text of the IDEA makes clear that parents have no right to the education itself.[4]
The Court concedes, as it must, that while the IDEA gives parents the right to reimbursement and procedural protection in explicit terms, it does not do so for the supposed right to the education itself. Ante, at 12. The obvious inference to be drawn from the statute’s clear and explicit conferral of discrete types of rights upon parents and children, respectively, is that it does not by accident confer the parent-designated rights upon children, or the children-designated rights upon parents. The Court believes, however, that “the statute prevents us from placing too much weight on [this] implicatio[n].” Ibid. That conclusion is in error. Nothing in “the statute,” undermines the obvious “implication” of Congress’s scheme. What the Court relies upon for its conclusion that parents have a substantive right to a FAPE is not the “statutory structure,” ante, at 13, but rather the myriad procedural guarantees accorded to parents in the administrative process, see ibid. But allowing parents, by means of these guarantees, to help shape the contours of their child’s education is simply not the same as giving them the right to that education. Nor can the Court sensibly rely on the provisions governing due process hearings and administrative appeals, the various provisions that refer to the “parent’s complaint,” see, e.g., 20 U. S. C. §1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), or the fact that the right-to-sue provision, §1415(i)(2)(A), refers to the administrative complaint, which in turn allows parents to challenge “any matter” relating to the provision of a FAPE, §1415(b)(6)(A). These provisions prove nothing except what all parties concede: that parents may represent their child pro se at the administrative level. See Brief for Petitioners 17–18, 40; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 12; Brief for Respondent 13, 44; see also Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Parents thus have the power, at the administrative stage, to litigate all of the various rights under the statute since at that stage they are acting not only on their own behalf, but on behalf of their child as well. This tells us nothing whatever about whose rights they are.[5] The Court’s spraying statutory sections about like buckshot cannot create a substantive parental right to education where none exists.
Harkening back to its earlier discussion of the IDEA’s “text and structure” (by which it means the statute’s procedural protections), the Court announces the startling proposition that, in fact, the “IDEA does not differentiate … between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents.” Ante, at 13. If that were so, the Court could have spared us its painful effort to craft a distinctive parental right out of scattered procedural provisions. But of course it is not so. The IDEA quite clearly differentiates between the rights accorded to parents and their children. See Emery v. Roanoke City School Bd., 432 F. 3d 294, 299 (CA4 2005) (“[P]arents and children are distinct legal entities under the IDEA” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As even petitioners’ amici agree, “Congress specifically indicated that parents have rights under the Act that are separate from and independent of their children’s rights.” Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 18. Does the Court seriously contend that a child has a right to reimbursement, when the statute most definitively provides that if “the parents of a child with a disability” enroll that child in private school, “a court … may require the [school district] to reimburse the parents for the cost of that enrollment”? §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (emphasis added); see also Brief for Senator Edward M. Kennedy et al. as Amici Curiae 21 (“The right of reimbursement runs to the parents”). Does the Court believe that a child has a procedural right under §§1414(d)(1)(C)(i)–(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), which gives parents the power to excuse an IEP team member from attending an IEP meeting? The IDEA does not remotely envision communal “family” rights.
The Court believes that because parents must prove the substantive inadequacy of a FAPE before obtaining reimbursement, §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV), and because the suitability of a FAPE may also be at issue when procedural violations are alleged, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), it is “out of accord with the statute’s design” to “prevent [parents] from obtaining a judgment mandating that the school district provide their child” with a FAPE. Ante, at 14. That is a total non sequitur. That Congress has required parents to demonstrate the inadequacy of their child’s FAPE in order to vindicate their own rights says nothing about whether parents possess an underlying right to education. The Court insists that the right to a FAPE is the right “most fundamental to the Act.” Ante, at 12. Undoubtedly so, but that sheds no light upon whom the right belongs to, and hence upon who can sue in their own right. Congress has used the phrase “party aggrieved,” and it is this Court’s job to apply that language, not to run from it.
The Court further believes that a distinction between parental and child rights will prove difficult to administer. I fail to see why that is so. Before today, the majority of Federal Courts of Appeals to have considered the issue have allowed parents to sue pro se with respect to some claims, but not with respect to the denial of a FAPE. See Mosely v. Board of Ed. of Chicago, 434 F. 3d 527, 532 (CA7 2006); Collingsru, 161 F. 3d, at 233; Wenger v. Canastota Central School Dist., 146 F. 3d 123, 126 (CA2 1998) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River Cty. School Bd., 121 F. 3d 576, 581, n. 17 (CA11 1997). The Court points to no evidence suggesting that this majority rule has caused any confusion in practice. Nor do I see how it could, since the statute makes clear and easily administrable distinctions between parents’ and children’s legal entitlements.
Finally, the Court charges that the approach taken by the majority of Courts of Appeals would perpetrate an “injustice,” ante, at 15, since parents who do not seek reimbursement or allege procedural violations would be “without a remedy,” ante, at 14–15. That, of course, is not true. They will have the same remedy as all parents who sue to vindicate their children’s rights: the power to bring suit, represented by counsel. But even indulging the Court’s perception that it is unfair to allow some but not all IDEA parents to proceed pro se, that complaint is properly addressed to Congress, which structured the rights as it has, and limited suit to “party aggrieved.” And there are good reasons for it to have done so. Pro se cases impose unique burdens on lower courts — and on defendants, in this case the schools and school districts that must hire their own lawyers. Since pro se complaints are prosecuted essentially for free, without screening by knowledgeable attorneys, they are much more likely to be unmeritorious. And for courts to figure them out without the assistance of plaintiff’s counsel is much more difficult and time-consuming. In both categories of pro se parental suit permitted under a proper interpretation of the statute, one or the other of these burdens is reduced. Actions seeking reimbursement are less likely to be frivolous, since not many parents will be willing to lay out the money for private education without some solid reason to believe the FAPE was inadequate. And actions alleging procedural violations can ordinarily be disposed of without the intensive record-review that characterizes suits challenging the suitability of a FAPE.
Petitioners sought reimbursement, alleged procedural violations, and requested a declaration that their child’s FAPE was substantively inadequate. Ante, at 3. I agree with the Court that they may proceed pro se with respect to the first two claims, but I disagree that they may do so with respect to the third.
Notes
[1] As the Court notes, ante, at 2, 18, petitioners also argue that even if parents do not have their own rights under the statute, they nonetheless may act on behalf of their child without retaining a lawyer. Both sides agree, however, that the common law generally prohibited lay parents from representing their children in court, a manifestation of the more general common-law rule that nonattorneys cannot litigate the interests of another. See Brief for Petitioners 37; Brief for Respondent 9–10; see also, e.g., Collingsru v. Palmyra Bd. of Ed., 161 F. 3d 225, 232 (CA3 1998). Nothing in the IDEA suggests a departure from that rule.
[2] Because the grant of those rights is clear, and because I find no statutory basis for any other rights, I need not decide whether the Spending Clause’s “clear notice” requirement is applicable here. Cf. Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U. S. ___, ___ (2006) (slip op., at 4).
[3] Of course when parents assert procedural violations, they must also allege that those violations adversely affected the outcome of the proceedings. Under Article III, one does not have standing to challenge a procedural violation without having some concrete interest in the outcome of the proceeding to which the violation pertains, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 571–578 (1992), here the parents’ interest in having their child receive an appropriate education.
[4] Nor can a parental right to education be justified, as the Court attempts, see ante, at 14–15, on the theory that the IDEA gives parents a legal right to free schooling for their child. Parents acquire such a right (in limited circumstances) only when they enroll their child in a private institution. §1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV).
[5] Contrary to indications in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 13, and to the apparent language of the statute, a hearing officer does not always render a decision “on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education.” §1415(f)(3)(E)(i) (2000 ed., Supp. IV). That provision is “[s]ubject to clause (ii),” ibid., which provides that “[i]n matters alleging a procedural violation” a hearing officer can grant relief if “the procedural inadequacies … significantly impeded the parents’ opportunity to participate in the decisionmaking process regarding the provision of a free appropriate public education to the parents’ child,” §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii)(II). It is true that a hearing officer who accepts such an allegation nominally grants relief by concluding that the child did not receive a FAPE, §1415(f)(3)(E)(ii), but it is clear from the structure of the statute that this is not a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, but rather the label attached to a finding of procedural defect. Petitioners agree with me on this point. See Brief for Petitioners 31, n. 23. See also 20 U. S. C. §1415(f)(3)(E)(iii) (2000 ed., Supp. IV) (“Nothing in this subparagraph shall be construed to preclude a hearing officer from ordering a local educational agency to comply with procedural requirements under this section”). In any event, even if a hearing officer was required to render a decision on the substantive adequacy of the FAPE, that feature of the statute still gives no clue as to whether parents’ vindication of that substantive right at the administrative stage is on their own behalf or on behalf of the child.
End of Decision

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I allege that my constitutional Rights , Privileges or Immunities have been Violated and that the following facts form the basis for my allegations:

Count 1: VIOLATION OF NH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 15,
VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, AMENDMENT 14
TITLE 18 U.S.C 1983, RETALIATION

Supporting Facts: Town of Hooksett prosecutor Kimberly Chabot, and Principle of the Hooksett Memorial School Carol Soucy through the police officer Linda War hall, denied me access to the Hooksett Memorial School (public domain). On October 19th 2006, and continuing. I was told by Linda War hall that I could not call, fax, email or enter the school building until a meeting could be arranged between Ms. Soucy, Ms War hall, and me, and if I violated this, I would be arrested. But this does not end here, I will now submit five documents in support of my facts: (1) A facsimile from Kimberly Chabot (Hooksett prosecutor) to my former attorney Raymond Foss, dated 11/9/2006, (2) a letter I sent to Mr. Foley CC to JKincaid (attorney for the Hooksett District School) dated Feb 26th, 2007, paying special attention to page 2, paragraph 7, (3) A letter to myself from Carol Soucy (principle Hooksett Memorial school) dated July 18th 2007, (4) 3 letters I sent to Ms. Carol Soucy dated, July 6th 2007, July 19th 2007, and July 24th 2007, and (5) a letter from Ms. Polak (newly appointed assistant to the school superintendent)
Ms. Chabot’s Facsimile to my attorney (referenced above) stated in part: “As you may or may not know, Ms. Campbell in the weeks preceding your involvement in this matter, caused great consternation and anxiety at the Hooksett Memorial School with her terse repeated telephone calls, unannounced disruptive visits, and rude behavior toward faculty, administration and staff.” I categorically, and unequivocally deny the above quote. This is a falsehood designed to augment, and justify the violations of NH CONST Art 15, U.S Amendment to the Const 14, and title 18 U.S. C 1983, and Retaliation because of my complaint to the Special Education Department. I did not know the name of the teacher who very kindly made copies of my son’s homework for me, and I attempted to get her name on several occasions, all to no avail. Then on July 18th, I suddenly received her name from Ms. Soucy, but with the added injury of a blatant untruth.
If I did what the prosecutor is alleging, then the nature of the calls, should be spelt out, and sent to me, a long time ago, even now, as I ask for this information: Reason dictates this! If I made repeated calls, and, particularly if they were “terse” then documentation of what I said, should have been spelt out, and sent to me, a long time ago, even now, as I ask for this information: In-fact, there ought to be a telephone record in our technical and advance world! The rude behavior likewise that is being alleged, should have been spelt out and sent to me, a long time ago, even now, as I ask for this information. My letter to Ms. Soucy of July 24th asked for these documents. It is a matter of fairness. In the name of justice that I receive such! But these documents do not exist, because NO SUCH THINGS OCCURRED! I AM STILL WAITING TO RECEIVE THEM! Maybe they need time to come up with answers….example Ms. Soucy’s letter of July 18th.
I now quote Ms. Kincaid (attorney for the Hooksett Memorial School): District response to parent’s Due Process hearing. “The district denies that it has restricted the parent’s access but agrees that the Hooksett police Department has imposed restrictions in the part over which the District has no control.” Ms Soucy’s letter of January 2007 (same letter Ms. Polak refers to, letter which I have requested another copy of Ms. Soucy, but which she declines on resending): Ms. Soucy’s letter had her letter-head, her signature. She spoke with authority, and it was independent of Ms. Chabot, reiterating what Ms. Chabot said, but with her (Ms. Soucy’s perspective): She had, and has jurisdiction in this conspiracy to deny me my civil rights, violation of title 18 U.S.C SECTION 241. I now turn my attention to the facsimile sent from prosecutor Chabot to my former attorney Raymond Foss, in an effort to shed some light on this convenient falsehood of Ms. Kincaid’s (1) on page 1 first paragraph of this document I RECOUNTED WHAT Ms. War hall (Hooksett police officer told me), she said that I could not call, fax, email or enter into the school building, as of October 19, 2006, ONLY UNTIL a meeting could be arranged between principal Carol Soucy, Ms. Campbell and Officer War hall.” What I am getting at here, is the fact that Ms. Soucy does have control. A meeting not between the police and Elizabeth alone, (Elizabeth who has no control), but Ms. Soucy. Ms Soucy then, had/have jurisdiction. (2) Not only does Ms. Soucy have control, and jurisdiction, but she gave the go-ahead to attorney Kincaid (in other words), CONSPIRED IN VIOLATION OF Title 18 U.S.C., SECTION 241 to have both Kimberly Chabot (Hooksett prosecutor) and Linda War hall (Hooksett police officer) to be present in the room adjacent to my son’s Due Process Hearing. Something practically un-heard of by the education Department. (See my letter from the NH education Department). I shall develop this aspect in Count V11; I stated it here to show the power of Ms. Soucy, principal of the Hooksett Memorial school who in collaborating with Jeanne Kincaid (attorney for the District) have concocted, yet another untruth! All my letters to all four of these people asking why the prosecutor, and the officer were present at the hearing have fallen on deaf ears. Wonder why? Please see my certified letters to Ms. Soucy, Ms Chabot, (officer of the court), Ms. War hall, and Ms. Kincaid (officer of the court). I asked: Why were you here (Chabot & War hall)? Who invited you? What did you hope to gain? Did you get what you came for? It was possible for them to hear everything that was going on, in the room. I heard the conversations in the room that was ongoing as I left and was in another room. This stipulation of Ms. Kincaid, is PATENTLY FALSE! Ms. Soucy then, had jurisdiction, had say in this unsavory business of violating my amendment rights…..denying Due Process! This became very convenient for Ms. Kincaid to deny.
In June of 2006, Ms. Polak sent me a letter regarding a 504 plan. In this letter, she reiterated Ms. Soucy’s position, not the police’s fax. Ms. Polak again demonstrated Ms. Soucy’s jurisdiction! The letter of Ms. Polak references Ms. Soucy’s power….the how and when I could communicate with Ms. Soucy. This letter is independent from the Hooksett police facsimile. It is an autonomous letter from a person independent in thought and action.
In January 2007, Ms. Kincaid set about to bully me into not going through with my son’s Due process hearing via the use of my former attorney Raymond Foss. A RIGHT, according to IDEA. I shall now include my email from my former attorney Raymond Foss of January 2007, its two pages: THIS LETTER SHOWS THE POWER, THE JURISDICTION, and THE CONTROL, OF ONE MS CAROL SOUCY. After the Resolution session of January 9th 2007, an inordinate amount of pressure was placed upon me to deny justice to my son. I said NO! Jeanne Kincaid, attorney, speaking for Ms. Carol Soucy, (principal of the Hooksett Memorial school), was willing to write a letter to the Hooksett police department to (Ms. Kimberly Chabot, woman they invited to my son’s Due process hearing)…. A letter that would allow me to return upon the grounds of the school, email, fax, and call the school, just like before. In other words, I could now resume advocating for my son! I now quote: “The district is willing to write a letter to the police-again I will draft the sample language for your consideration.” (See exhibit letter of JKincaid to attorney Foss dated Jan 08/2007 at 17:40) I shall include a copy of this letter as part of my exhibit. This letter was emailed by Jeanne Kincaid, to my former attorney Raymond Foss……the sample language for “your consideration.” (Foss’s). I am not suicidal. I love my son. I love self. I am not about self-hate. Sorry Ms. Kincaid.
Ms. Chabot being a practicing prosecutor, is fully aware of the Rights of Due Process, and the 14th Amendment granted under the United States constitution. Ms Chabot was aware also, that I had one legal consul at the time, and that Civil rights, or Criminal law, was not his specialty. She made educated decisions that I could not afford another attorney at that time: Ms. Chabot therefore believed that she could abridged this Black woman’s Rights and get away with it. She also knew that my son would bear the consequences, I now quote page 2 from her facsimile of 11/9/2006: “ It was NOT the intent of this Department or of the Hooksett Memorial school staff, as I understand it, to obstruct or hinder Ms. Campbell’s reasonable access to Hooksett Memorial School faculty, administration and staff to address educational issues involving her son.” Incidentally, again the heavy typed underlined phrase above delineates the joint conspiracy.
But Ms. Chabot prosecutor, knew fully well the intended consequences (educational issues involving her son). An innocent child; Of course the school, or the Department of education did not find an advocate meanwhile to ensure my son’s rights as the IDEA law states: “Each public agency must ensure that the rights of a child are protected by determining the need for, and assigning, a surrogate parent whenever: No parent (as newly defined at 34 CFR 300.30) can be identified; The public agency, after reasonable efforts, cannot locate a parent; The child is a ward of the state under the laws of that state; or the child is an unaccompanied homeless youth as defined in section 725 (6) of the [34 CFR 300.519(a) and (b) [20 U.S.C. 1415(b)(2)(A)……” Here, I can be found I am available, the school has made null & void Joshua’s Rights under IDEA……atlas, Ms Soucy, Mr. Foley Mr. Brune did not see to it that Josh had an advocate! (PROCEDURAL VIOLATION).
Please see Ms. Soucy’s letter to: (Dear Parents/Guardians: Oct 5, 2006). I now quote one part only: “This letter is written to inform you of a recent change and welcome addition to our school district’s programming. Hooksett Police Officer Lynda War hall has recently been assigned to the position of School Resource Officer (SRO). Hooksett has never had an official School Resource Officer before this week. We believe that increased police presence will provide enhanced safety for our schools. Frequent SRO visits within the school community and more detailed familiarity with school grounds will help our police department respond more effectively to critical incidents.”
On Thursday July 19th 2007, I sent a letter to Ms. Soucy, same letter to Ms. Kincaid asking for copies of, and information regarding some items. To date, I have only received 1 item. One of the things I asked for information regarding, was item # (4). “Statement regarding why the “Resource Officer” was no longer present at the school after the Due Process Hearing.” You may remember that I was banned from the school, and naturally just like everything else, this had direct repercussion on Josh. I was also banned from placing Josh on other buses going to the school, so that if Josh missed his bus outside his door, then, too bad: NO SCHOOL FOR THAT DAY! (and this is in line with the type of education that Ms. Soucy had in mind for Josh): Attorney Foss, was able to let Ms. Soucy see the immediate folly of this one, (not that she cared….but, she had to give in, …a phony type of way); so, I was allowed to drive Josh to the school, but I could not get out of the car. Wonder what would have happened if someone passed out, or got hit by a car and needed immediate aid….seeing that I am a nurse. Would I be covered by the Good Samaritan law still? Or would Ms. Chabot’s rule take precedent? Perhaps judge Lapointe knows the answer.
WHY! WE STILL NEEDED “ENHANCED SAFETY.” PERHAPS EVEN MORE SO NOW; FOR KNOWN TO MS. CHABOT ET AL., WAS THE OUTCOME OF THE HEARING. ELIZABETH CAMPBELL AND HER SON JOSHUA HIGGINS HAD LOST. I MEAN ELIZABETH IS VIOLENT (ACCORDING TO JKINCAID): YOU MEAN TO TELL ME THEN, THAT MS. SOUCY AND MS. CHABOT, THAT THEY, THEY HAVE FAILED THE SCHOOL. THE CHILDREN, FACULTY AND STAFF. MS. SOUCY FAILED TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SAFETY. A NEGRESS IS ON THE LOOSE, AND THE STAFF, FACULTY AND CHILDREN’S SAFETY ARE AT BAY!
FOR IS THIS NOT THE REASON WHY WE ARE TOLD WHY WE NEED AN SRO? SAFETY RESOURCE OFFICER? SURELY TIS NOT TO HARRASS, INTIMIDATE, AND DENY A NIGGER, PARDON ME, A NEGRO WHITE RIGHTS?
We live in an age in America where school violence is all too real! I worry about my son, just as most thinking and responsive parents/guardians/loved ones worry about their little ones, and not so little ones! IF MS. CHABOT FELT AND BELIEVED THAT I WAS A CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER, OR POSSIBLE FUTURE DANGER TO THE LIVES OF CHILDREN, AND STAFF, THEN SHE IS DUTY BOUND TO GET THE ARREST WARRANT VIA AN EMERGENCY DECLARATION TO JUDGE LAPOINTE OF THE HOOKSETT DISTRICT COURT . PARENTS COULD OR SHOULD NEVER FORGIVE ANY CARELESS PROSECUTOR, AS I WOULD NOT, IF SOMETHING HAPPENED TO MY CHILD, AND SHE KNEW IN ADVANCED.
BUT THIS WAS NOT SO, AND THIS PROSECUTOR, Kimberly Chabot (of Hooksett) LIKE NiFong, ACTED, AND BELIEVED THAT SHE IS THE LAW! SHE BECAME JUDGE AND JUROR, SHE DEPRIVED ME OF MY RIGHTS, AND SENTENCED MY SON!
I COULD NEVER MEET WITH SOMEONE, OR ANYONE WHO VIOLATED ME.



Count 11: VIOLATION OF NH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 22
VIOLATION OF UNITED STATES AMENDMENT 1, AND
CLAUSE OF THAT FIRST AMENDMENT; RETALIATION.,


Supporting Facts: I had been writing emails to the school for the past 3 years, speaking against Liberalism in society in general, and in the public school system in particular: This came about as the result of the school not implementing Joshua’s IEP. In September 2006, I made a complaint to the Special Education Department after my son a child identified with a speech/language impairment came home with an assignment without directions. I had been asking the school for a period of three years for a syllabus and was continually given lip service during the IEP meetings, but nothing came home but a summary of the classes….far less than what I was told would be coming, and what I agreed to. This was not in keeping with what I asked for at his IEP meetings as it was useless, and meaningless.
This mother had spoken to Joanne Esau, assigned complaint investigator for about 2-3 times via the telephone. In one of those conversations Ms. Esau told this writer that she looked at my son’s IEP and she checked his record including the minutes from the meetings and she did not see the word syllabus any where. What Ms. Esau said was, what I did see was lots of emails from you, I can tell that you have been asking for a syllabus in the emails but there is no reference to it in the IEP, or the minutes from the meetings. Then she said something interesting to me, she said, you know I listen to Rush too, (my guard came down) and as I was warming up towards her she quickly said, “its good to know what those people(my emphasis) are up to.” Something in her tone told me that she was not speaking positively of Rush. (Details in exhibit).
Ms Esau then told me; “why did you not make the school put a syllabus onto the IEP”? I was flabbergasted and taken by surprise, for I had been trying to get the school to implement the child’s syllabus for 3 years and was definitely unsuccessful, that’s why I was “here” without thinking (and I have since realized that what I said was wrong given today’s climate with school violence), nevertheless, I rhetorically said “what do you want me to do, put a gun to their heads and make them do it? …….I’ve got you involved, and I am actively looking for an attorney.” Truth is, I had/have no power to make the school do anything that they were not interested in doing; in fact, Ms Soucy the principle would later tell my former attorney Raymond Foss, that “she (meaning me) was the only parent asking for a syllabus,” when Mr. Foss asked her if I was wrong to asked for such she remained silent, and today, still has not answered that question.
On October 19th 2006, while I went to the school to pick up my son to take him to his annual physical appointment, I was met by police officer Linda War hall of the Hooksett police department, who told me that I was not allowed to to call, fax, email or visit the school (a public domain) until a meeting could be arranged with Ms. Soucy, myself and her, and that if I violated this, I would be arrested. When I asked her for a copy of this information, she refused. Ms War hall said that I made a threat to the school officials.
Later, I realized that two things had happened to me. (1) Ms. Esau did not like the content of my emails to the school all these years; her pretense of liking Rush Limbaugh, and then “dropping the bomb” …..It became important to her, to let me know, that Mr. Limbaugh’s views were not her views. I knew that in that conversation with her I did not threaten anyone. My statement to her was in response to the nonsense she asked me….and quite by surprise. I knew too, that my statement to her was one of rhetoric: She was fully aware of the content and atmosphere with which my statement was voiced. I was aware too, that she does not like Rush, and she made it known. (2) I am also aware that Ms. Soucy was upset that I made that complaint to the Special Education board. She never planned to implement my son’s IEP contrary to her after the fact statements. You will discover, if you have not discovered by now, that, neither Ms. Soucy, or Ms. (Kincaid District attorney) have any respect for law or rule. Thus Ms. Soucy’s statement to my former attorney Foss; “she was the only parent asking for a syllabus.” {Foss}….”was she wrong in asking for one”? Silence, the deafening silence!
Both Ms. Soucy, and Ms. Esau had reasons to cause me harm. Therefore the involvement of the Hooksett police. They did not like my speech…..emails to the school all these years…..imagine! A Republican Negress! Who does she think she is?
The school District agreed to the outside testing and evaluation of my son (to be payed for by them according to IDEA/504 policy/rules. More about this specific law in my son’s complaint)…..I made a complaint to the OCR (Office For Civil Rights), Ms. Kincaid became aware of this, and she wrote an email to my former attorney Raymond Foss, stating that if I did not withdraw my complaint, the school would withdraw the agreed upon testing for Josh. (Letter included in exhibit/document from Mr. Foss). I believe that the United states Constitution gave me (1) Rights of Free Speech, (2) neither my child, or myself should suffer because I chose to exercise my free speech rights, my Right to petition the government for legal redress, but then, I am a Negress, only White Republicans can say this! Definitely a White liberal
Subsequently, Ms Kincaid Retaliated against me: Consequently, my son did not have the benefit of outside testing as per IDEA regulations. “At no time has the District or its agents, including its attorneys, retaliated against the parent for exercising her rights. The department lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the allegations contained in the Complaint pertaining to retaliation.” (JKincaid, pg 2, # 3, from School District Response to Hearing Complaint, July 5th 2007). The hearing Officer Peter Foley Condoned this behaviour. Neither did he commented upon this injustice, or take it into consideration, so he ruled that my son was no longer eligible for Special Education….Speech therapy he desperately needs! He is a Negro after-all! (MORE ABOUT THIS IN SON’S COMPLAINT)



Count 111: NH CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 15, AMENDMENT 14 VIOLATIONS
UNLAWFUL DETAINMENT, HARASSMENT, AND INTIMIDATION
TITTLE 18 U.S.C. SEC 241; 242

Supporting Facts: On October 19th, 2006, I was physically and emotionally abused, and my son was emotionally abused. Officer Linda War hall upon quickly intersecting me, as she knew that I was coming to the school to pick up Josh (I figured after the ordeal), she walked into my pathway, as I was about to enter the main school door; she immediately invaded my personal space, and started yelling at me. “You are not allowed on school property!” Ms. War hall then place her face directly into mine talking rapidly, loudly, and purposely spitting in my face, I was afraid, and did not know what to think. I tried to walk back towards my car, and she got back to my car and stood with her body to the entrance of the driver’s side, so that I could not enter my car: She kept repeating herself, telling me, “you cannot call, fax, email, or come to this school again, unless you meet with myself and the principle Carol Soucy.” I heard her, and wanted to leave. I wanted to get away, let my son either come home by bus, or I could have a friend pick him up, but Ms. War hall was on a war path. She wanted to arrest me, she had lost control. I knew that I had to keep in control because my son was dependent upon me. It was not easy to allow someone to spit in your face. Ms War hall then started to calm down, she told me that I could go and get my son, I was not about to because (1) I was scared, (2) I was embarrassed as I felt the eyes of parents, and school staff watching, (3) I wanted to get away. I got into my car, and made an attempt to leave, but Ms. War hall quickly put her body in the direct path of the car, I had parked head in, and had to reverse. I turned off the ignition, and she said that she will get my son. When my son arrived, after he had buckled his seat, Ms War hall started again, reciting the new rules for me again, she banged loudly on my car, and my son started to cry. I tried to reassure him that everything was OK. Truth is, I was not sure of this. Ms War hall finally left, and I was able to leave. I believe that Ms. War hall was trying to instigate me, she wanted to arrest me. Then on April 6th shortly before noon, I received a telephone call from Ms. War hall. Ms War hall was demanding that I meet with her and Ms. Soucy, I did not pick up the telephone, but erased the message. About 40 minutes or so, perhaps an hour, I was on the telephone at home, and then there was a very loud and distinct knock. I looked out via the peep hole and saw two officers, a man, (though I did not see his face clearly) and officer War hall. They continued to knock very loudly. They took turns talking and asking me to open my door. I asked them why they were here, and if something was wrong. They did not answer my questions, just insisted that I open my door. I asked them if they had a warrant, Ms. War hall said no. I told her that they could talk to me from behind the door as I was not opening the door. I had a sixth sense, that she had come to do the job she wanted to do at the school, that was to arrest me, and I was not going to let that happen. They both took turns pounding on my door, this went on for 22 minutes, I had a friend on the telephone that was determined to stay on with me, and she advised me as well not to open the door. So now I was being harassed at my abode. The male officer said, since you will not open the door, we have no choice but to tell you, and we will say it loud so that your neighbours would hear, then officer War hall said, “We will be directing a CHINS against you, and we will inform DCYF.” They screamed this very loudly. It was intended to call attention to my neighbors. So now, here was the Hooksett police at my abode, harassing, threatening, and intimidating me, and causing a scene at my home, and I was powerless to stop it. Nothing ever came out of this. I never saw any CHINS, I could only surmise that they did come to arrest me.


Count 1V: AMENDMENT 14 VIOLATION, IDEA/504 VIOLATION, TITLE 18
U.S.C SEC 242, AMENDMENT 1 VIOLATION, NH CONST. ART 22

Supporting Facts: Prosecutor Kimberly Chabot, and Linda War hall came to my son’s Due Process hearing. They sat in the room adjacent to the hearing. They conferred with the Hearing Officer, Jeanne Kincaid (attorney for the school District) , and other staff from the school District as well. I witnessed this during breaks from the hearing. They violated my son’s as well as my privacy Rights. The Department of Education has written me a letter after I inquired about the reason why Kimberly Chabot (Hooksett prosecutor) and Linda War hall (Hooksett police officer) were present. I now quote an excerpt from this letter: “Neither the department nor the hearing officer, as an agent of the department, has any reason to invite anyone to a hearing. The only exception to this rule is when there is a request, which must be made through the hearing officer to the department, for the presence of a law enforcement officer because a participant feels physically threatened- and that was not the case in your hearing. There was no request from the hearing officer to this office to provide an officer.” The hearing of this 10 year old boy in search for justice has nothing to do with the Hooksett police, or the prosecutor. I have written certified letters to Ms Kincaid, attorney for the School District, Ms. Soucy principle of the Hooksett Memorial School, Ms.Chabot, Hooksett prosecutor, and Ms. War hall Hooksett police, asking them who invited them, (Chabot, and War hall) why were they present, etc, and they have remained silent. I shall include them here as part of the exhibit. I maintain that this was the continual police Harassment and Intimidation, it had become personal, “To get this nigger.” (As a Hooksett resident told me). Ms Kincaid did everything in her power to deny me of this day of justice for my son. I shall develop this more in court.
I include IDEA/504 here because I am the parent (unfortunately) of a disabled child. I am a poor Black woman, and a nurse. I have had to educate myself quickly with the bare minimum, to make sure that my son is educated, and not fall victim to the historical law that forbid a negro to learn how to read, and to be educated. The Standing doctrine involves constitutional and prudential requirements, I am only citing the following in an attempt to help you understand why I include IDEA/504 Violation in my suit for justice for myself.
The constitutional standing rules ensure the existence of a concrete “case or Controversy” as required by article 111:(A)t an irreducible minimum Art.111 requires me to show that I have suffered as the result of this punitive illegal conduct by Ms. Esau, Ms. Soucy, Ms. Chabot, Ms. War hall, Ms. Kincaid, Mr. Foley, and Mr. Tracy. This injury can be traced to my original complaint to the Special Education Department: Because of the many issues including years of email (my speech) guaranteed under Amendment 1 to the United States Constitution, the abridgement of my Civil Rights by Mr. Tracy, Ms. Chabot, Ms. War hall; Ms. Soucy, (the latter abridged both Amendment 1, and 14, and NH Const. Art 15; and Art 22) the Actions of JKincaid the latter including Retaliation, because I did not withdraw my OCR complaint, causing my son to suffer and the Actions and rulings of Mr. Peter Foley, And, the LIE VIA OMISSION by Ms. Joanne Esau, (abridging Amendment 1 of the United States constitution, and NH Art 22) now cite (in my attempt to clarify), Valley Forge Christian college V. Americans united for separation of church and State, Inc,454 U.S 464, 472, (1982). In meeting my constitutional requirement.
In addition to the Constitutional Standing, Prudential consideration aimed at preventing courts from adjudicating “questions of broad social impact where no individual rights would be vindicated: Phillips Petroleum Co. V. Shutts, 472 U.S. 799, 804 (1985). This will rest on my own legal Rights and Interests. The zone of interests require “an indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would –be plaintiff,” instead the proper inquiry is simply whether the interest sought to be protected by me is arguably within the zone of interest to be protected….by the statue. “National Credit Union Admin V. Nat’l Bank and Trust Co., 522 U.S.479, 492 (1988). Zone of interest is our issue here
The language and structure of IDEA…….does my retaliation claim falls within the zone of interests protected by IDEA? YES! What, is my role as parent? To make sure that Josh receives a FAPE as outlined in his IEP. Joshua’s IEP was not fully implemented until the entry of attorney Raymond Foss (this to be pursued in his complaint, but mentioned here in order to clarify( my interests). IDEA establishes that elaborate mechanism for parental involvement. It designates me as part of the IEP plan team. See id 1414(d) (1) (B) (i) requiring revision of the IEP to address information provided either by, or to parents regarding Joshua’s educational needs and services, see id 1414 (d) (4) (A) (111) and mandating that parents must be “members of any group that make decisions on the educational placement of their child.” Id.1414(f). In addition to extensive procedures for parental involvement in the IEP, the IDEA also ensures procedures for parental involvement in the consent to educational evaluations see id 1414(a) (1) (c) (i) and (c) (3), assigning a surrogate parent to “protect the rights of the child,” when the child’s parents are not known or cannot be located. (I could be located, but I WAS DENIED FROM ADVOCATING FOR MY CHILD VIA MS. SOUCY, MS. WAR HALL, AND MS. CHABOT): AND THERE WAS NO ATTEMPT TO FIND ANYONE TO ADVOCATE FOR JOSH EITHER! See 20 U.S C. 1415(b) (2) and mandating “an opportunity for the parents of a child with a disability to examine all records relating to such child,”id 1415(b) (1). IDEA also authorizes the Secretary of Education to make grants available to support “parent training and information centers” to help parents understand their child’s disability, participate in decision making processes, and the development of Individualized Education programs and utilize IDEA’S Procedural Safeguards. See id 1482. In Summary then, I (Elizabeth Campbell), mother of this dear boy, have met the arguably within the zone retaliation complaint, and would have standing under IDEA to bring retaliation complaint.
Furthermore, the IDEA Complaint provision in Subchapter 1 affords the “opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of my son, Joshua Higgins, or the provision of a FAPE to him.” See id 1415 (b) (6) my retaliatory claim is related to the Identification, evaluation, or educational placement of Josh, and my effort to gain for him the FAPE.



Count V U.S PRIVACY ACT OF 1988; 20.U.S.C.S and 1232 g (a) (5) (A); also
FERPA REGULATION 34CFR PART 99

Supporting Facts: Ms. Carol Soucy, principal of the Hooksett Memorial School, violated my right to privacy in respect to the Privacy act of 1988 and the FERPA regulations. Ms Soucy did not meet principle 10, or principle 11 of this Act. There was no emergency. This was a malicious and vindictive act in league with everything else she has done to me.
As I was barred from the school by Kimberly Chabot and Ms. Soucy via Ms. War hall police officer, I could not drive my son onto the property if he missed the school bus. Josh is very slow in the morning, regardless of what time he wakes up. Rushing him makes things worse. I was forced to place my son on another bus, if we missed the one in front of our home. I do not quite remember the exact day and date, or month, but it was during 2007 spring school year, I received a telephone call from one of the school bus drivers, who told me that she has directed the other bus drivers not to pick up Josh, as it was a liability issue. Now it is clear, that the school does not want my Negro son to receive a FAPE, it became clear too, that Ms. Soucy did not want him to get to school either. “FERPA allows, but does not require schools to release “directory information,” including student’s names, and addresses to the public (20. U. S. C .S)and 1232 g(a) (5) (A). However, this exception was modified in 2002, and high schools are now required to provide students’ names, addresses, and telephone numbers to military recruits, unless a student or parent opts out of such disclosure. The regulations at 34 CFR part 99 states specifically who may, or may not have access to student’s records. NO WHERE DO I SEE THAT SCHOOL BUS DRIVERS ARE ALLOWED TO HAVE ACCESS. WHILE THE REGULATIONS SPEAK OF EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, THIS WAS NOT AN EMERGENCY SITUATION, BUT A FLAGRANT AND CONTINUED VIOLATION OF THIS NEGROES RIGHTS! FURTHERMORE, MY TELEPHONE NUMBER IS UNLISTED FOR A REASON.
I asked the bus driver how she got my telephone number. My number was unlisted. It was a private number. I did not give the school any authority to share it with anyone. There was no Emergency! In other words, Ms. Soucy could have sent home a letter that day with Josh, as she has in the past. This was indeed abuse of me, and a malicious act. Subsequently, attorney Foss told them that they were going too far and they said that I could drive Josh to the school, but that I could not get out of the car.
Subsequently, I was forced to change my telephone number, the school would later meet, and de-Identified my son, without my involvement, even when they knew I had counsel, claiming that they could not reach me! That my telephone number was disconnected! But certainly, they had my counsel’s email, work address, and telephone number. This again, was the continuation and denial of my rights, because I am a Negro. The continuation and denial of Due Process, the Retaliation because I dared to make a complaint because they would not implement my son’s IEP, the continuing anger because they do not like my speech, hence, again more retaliation.


Count V1 AMENDMENT 14 VIOLATION; AMENDMENT 1 VIOLATION, IDEA/504 VIOLATION (28 CFR 36.206 (a) (1) (4); Sec 241. Title 18, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 BASED UPON RACE

Supporting Facts: Jeanne Kincaid the attorney for the Hooksett District school, and the Hearing officer Peter Foley, have Conspired with Carol Soucy principle of the Hooksett District school, Kimberly Chabot, Hooksett prosecutor, and Linda War hall, Hooksett police woman to(1) maintain intimidation and harassment against me: Ms. Kincaid, and Mr. Foley invited the prosecutor and the police woman to my son’s Due Process hearing, where they sat in a room adjacent to the hearing, and conferred with them during breaks, in my presence! I have asked Ms. Kincaid why they were present and SILENCE has been her response. I was able to get Sarah Browning, Special assistant for the Commissioner to ask Mr. Foley why they (Chabot & Warhall) were at the hearing, and this is an excerpt from Ms. Browning’s email: “As you requested, I did ask him if he knew why Ms. Chabot and Ms. War hall were at the hearing office at the time of your hearing. His response was, as I expected, that he didn’t know why they were there and because they were not part of the hearing, they had to wait in the reception area.” (Wed, Jul 18th 2007). I am not gullible, and there are many questions to be asked. They convened with him and the other people from the school throughout the breaks, however, and there was silence as I pass them twice, however!
(2) Ms. Kincaid Made good on her threat of retaliation to me, making my son suffer the consequences (by not having outside evaluations); (3) Conspired with Peter Foley, to Deny my son the rights afforded him under NH law, and Federal law thereby he looked the other way, and made unlawful, immoral and racist rulings that were dismissive of any form of justice or decency; (4) Lied about an investigation into the abuse of my son by the principle Soucy, she stated that an investigator, and the commissioner had ruled that there was no abuse. The commissioner was totally unaware of the complaint! (my conversation with Ms. Browning); (5) Ms. Kincaid oversaw the distribution of son’s record to the Hooksett police department without consent of parent, stating that, “The District has not improperly exchanged any personally identifiable information about the student to school bus drivers or the school resource officer, both entities qualifying as “school officials” entitled to access educational records under FERPA.” (A blatant miscarriage of justice, and misrepresentation of the law, as I stated in Complaint #1).
(6a) this hearing was not about Constitutional rights, but IDEA. IT WAS FOR AND ABOUT MY SON. THE HOOKSETT PROSECUTOR, KIMBERLY CHABOT, AND LINDA WAR HALL HAD NO REASON TO BE PRESENT IN A ROOM ADJACENT TO THE HEARING LISTENING IN, AND CONVENING DURING BREAKS, AND THEN MORE FULLY AT THE ENDING. (NORTHERN WHITES TYPICALLY SPEAK ABOUT “SOUTHERN JUSTICE” WITH A CERTAIN CONNOTATION….I, ELIZABETH CAMPBELL, KNOW ABOUT NORTHERN JUSTICE NEW HAMPSHIRE STYLE.
THIS COULD ONLY HAPPEN WITH THE CONDONING MORALITY OF PETER FOLEY AND JEANNE KINCAID. HOW LONG IN THE STATE OF NH HAVE THEY BEEN MISCARRYING JUSTICE (TO A MOSTLY WHITE PUBLIC)? THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION IS AWARE OF THEIR FOLLY IT WOULD APPEAR, BUT HAS TURNED A BLIND EYE THROUGHOUT THE YEARS.
I BELIEVE THAT MANY LAWYERS ON THE OPPOSING SIDE HAVE SUFFERED THROUGHOUT THE YEARS AS WELL, AS THEY SOUGHT JUSTICE FOR INNOCENT CLIENTS. I BELIEVE THAT THIS CONSPIRACY TO DENY, AND DEFRAUD THE PUBLIC, IS MANY YEARS IN THE MAKING. THE PEOPLE ARE INEFFECTIVE WHEN FACED WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION WHO HAS ACCESS TO THOUSANDS OF $ FROM TAX-PAYERS; (AS IN MY CASE) HAVE CAUSED ME TO LOOSE TWO JOBS; BRING UP OLD PHONY CHARGES AGAINST ME, IN THE HOPE THAT I WOULD BE AFRAID AND WITHDRAW MY COMPLAINT. INDEED THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION HAS CALLED UPON THEIR RESOURCES IN CONTACTING DHHS…,THERE HAS BEEN INTERFERENCE OF MY MAIL; I HAVE GOTTEN MANY TELEPHONE CALLS AT VARIOUS HOURS FROM SOLICITORS; THE LOCAL HOOKSETT COURT WHERE KIMBERELY CHABOT IS PROSECUTOR HAVE EVEN SENT ME A SUMMONS THAT WAS DIRECTED PURELY AT HARRASSMENT; NOT TO MENTION THE BARRAGE OF SPAM MAIL, WHICH WAS INITIALLY PORNOGRAPHIC, AND THEN BECAME EMBROILED IN FINANCIAL ENDEAVORS AS MS. KINCAID ONCE WORKED AT A COLLEGE WHERE I ENLISTED THE HELP FOR FINANCIAL “COUNSELING ETC.” BEING AWARE OF WHAT WAS HAPPENING TO MY RIGHTS OF CONFIDENTIALITY, I OPENLY TOLD FOLEY AND KINCAID DURING THE HEARING, THAT I RECENTLY FILED,………… AND THEY KNEW! BUT NOT FOR THE FIRST TIME!




REQUEST FOR RELIEF.

I have been injured in profound ways. When a healthy little boy starts bed-wetting, something he stopped doing at age 4. When your child says Please mommy, don’t make me go back there. When you lose your job after you accused the school of violating HIPAA, and your educational resource person comes to work very early that morning seeking you out! EXPLAINING WHAT HIPAA IS! (AS OPPOSED TO FERPA) When you lose your job 3 weeks later, and a Bankruptcy attorney that you use who is very friendly with your major opponent, sends you a letter telling you that you made an obligation to pay your debt….BUT HOW ARE YOU GOING TO OBLIGED WHEN “SOMEONE”, GAVE OUT YOUR WORK ADDRESS, AND WHO KNOWS WHAT OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION; AND CAUSED YOU (INDIRECTLY) TO LOOSE YOUR JOB! INSTITUTIONS FEAR THAT THE NEXT TIME THE STATE EVALUATORS IS THEY, (IF YOU DON’T GO) THEN……..NO JAACO! ………… ARE WE LIVING IN AMERICA?
OR, IS THIS COMMUNIST RUSSIA PRE GLASNOS/PERISTROYKA!
BECAUSE I HAVE A FOUNDATION ROOTED IN CONSERVATIVE BELIEFS, I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO REMAIN ERECT.
I have suffered immeasurable pain, all because I want my son to be educated. I have also discovered pure hatred, and evil.
(1) I would like reimbursement for my son’s education
(2) Emotional distress
(3) And, according to NH RSA 508: 4-C DAMAGES
(4) Damages for job interruptions/instability; loss wages, stress pain & suffering.
I certify that attorney M Hewey (attorney for the Hooksett school District, (including SHarrises, MPolak, CSoucy& JKincaid); state officials JFillion, SBrowning, LTracy, PFoley, and JEsau, were all served electronically, while KChabot, LWar Hall, were served via first class mail, or in person: On this day of January 15th 2008. My electronic signature carries full weight and force as my written signature for this document.

January 15th 2008,
Elizabeth Campbell

Christopher King said...

This education stuff is best handled by our affiliate site, Justiceforkids.net but I will be looking into it.

IEP abuse is a huge issue.

Run Attorney Giselle Johnson's name on this blawg and see what you get.

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Meanwhile, still waiting on my documents from Franconia, as if they were Holy Grail and whatnot.

-c